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FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A FORM OF

PERSECUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) raises significant questions not
only regarding the human rights of women and girls, but also regarding our
responsibilities to each other as individuals, groups, and sovereign states within a
global community. Although some have advocated complete western noninvolvement in the efforts to eradicate FGM, cultural sensitivity and respect do not
demand cultural relativism' or abdication of responsibility toward others as human
beings. Instead of the abandonment that accompanies cultural relativism, this
Comment proposes that the eradication of FGM requires responses on at least three
levels: the individual, the domestic, and the international. Although this Comment
briefly discusses individual and international approaches to confronting culturally
challenging practices, it focuses on one aspect of the domestic level, specifically, the
treatment of FGM as persecution for purposes of asylum.2 This Comment concludes

1. "Cultural relativism can be described, in its simplest form, as the theory that there is infinite cultural
diversity and that all cultural practices are equally valid." Katherine Brennan, The Influence of CulturalRelativism
on InternationalHuman Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 LAw & INEQ. J. 367, 370 (1989). One
result of such a philosophy is that no cultural practice can be rejected or criticized by anyone outside of the society
in question. The existence, however, of a body of peremptory, non-derogable human rights norms is evidence that
the world community rejects the notion that cultural practices are beyond examination and comment by "outsiders."
For a more in-depth discussion of cultural relativism in the context of female genital mutilation (FGM), see infra Part
I.B.
2. Because this Comment is primarily concerned with FGM in the context of asylum law, it will not address
other aspects of the domestic treatment of FGM, except to recognize the legislative outgrowths of recent public
attention to FGM in the media. As a result of the public's attention to this contested and troubling practice, five states
(California, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Tennessee) have made FGM illegal. See Carol M. Ostrom,
Hospital Debates Issue of Circumcising Muslim Girls, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Sept. 29, 1996, at A14,
available in WESTLAW, NOTPCN database, 1996 WL 11189728; Max Vanzi, Ethiopian Led Campaignto Ban
Female Mutilations, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A20, availablein WESTLAW, LATIMES database, 1996 WL
11647000. Similarly, Congress recently enacted federal legislation outlawing the practice. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 116
(Cum. Ann. Pocket Part 1997). Under the new legislation, federal authorities must tell new immigrants from countries
where FGM is practiced that having a female child circumcised in the United States can result in up to five years in
prison. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1374(a)(2)(B) (Cum. Ann. Pocket Part 1997). Moreover, the same penalty can be imposed
on anyone who circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris
of anyone under 18 years of age. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 116(a) (Cum. Ann. Pocket Part 1997). Some questions remain
regarding this language. For instance, it is unclear from the statutory language whether "circumcises" is meant to
cover sunna circumcision (that is, the cutting or removal of the prepuce (hood) of the clitoris), and whether the
proscribed procedures are permissible if requested by adult women for themselves.
The questions surrounding the new federal legislation are significant, especially in light of the debate occurring
at the Harborview Medical Center in Seattle. See Ostrom, supra at A14, 1996 WL 11189728. Approximately thirty
mothers, all from Somalia, have requested doctors at Harborview to circumcise their daughters. See Seattle Doctors
ConsiderModified Female Circumcision (All Things Considered,National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 17, 1996),
available in WESTLAW, ALLCONS database, 1996 WL 12726879. Although Harborview has not granted any of
these requests, its doctors are concerned that these mothers will take their young daughters to someone without
medical training to have the procedure done. Harborview doctors are considering a "compromise" that would allow
sunna circumcision for girls twelve and older who have given consent (to the extent that a twelve year old child can
give consent). See id. Because of the ambiguity of the federal legislation's language, it is unclear whether or not this
compromise would violate the new federal prohibition. Even if legal, however, opponents of FGM argue that such
a compromise is not justified by the concern that something more grave than the circumcision might happen to the
child if these doctors do not act. See id. In fact, says Nahid Toubia, it is uncertain whether such a procedure would
even satisfy the Somalis' cultural obligations, because the compromise procedure does not remove sexually responsive
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that granting asylum based on FGM is appropriate for two reasons. First, granting
asylum in cases based on FGM will protect persecuted women and girls. Second, by
granting asylum, the United States will contribute to the development of a customary
international norm against FGM without interfering in the internal affairs of other
States.
II. THE PRACTICE OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
31
Because other writers have extensively documented FGM, I will not do so in great
detail here. However, some basic information about FGM is necessary as a founda4
tion for the issues discussed in this Comment. FGM is an ancient,' but ongoing, cultural practice in which girls and women have their sexual organs cut, scraped, and
removed. Three versions of FGM exist: (1) clitoridectomy (partial or complete
removal of the clitoris); (2) excision (removal of both the clitoris and inner labia);
and (3) infibulation (removal of the clitoris and some or all of the labia minora, plus
6
the incision and
incision and scraping of the labia majora. In infibulation, after
7
scraping, thorns, silk, or catgut are used to hold the skin together. The girl's legs are
then wrapped tightly so that a hood of skin will form and cover the urethra and most
9
of the vagina.' This often takes as long as one month. Only a small opening remains
t While clitoridectomy and excision account for
after infibulation is complete.)."

tissue. See id. Thus, it is unclear whether the compromise procedure will prevent further harm to the children. See
id.
In addition to criminalizing FGM, "[t]he new [federal] law also requires United States representatives to the World
Bank and other international financial institutions that have lent billions of dollars to the 28 African countries where
the practice continues to oppose loans to governments that have not carried out educational programs to end it." Celia
W. Dugger, New U.S. Law Bans African Rite ofFemale Genital Cutting, THE PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 15, 1996,
at A6, available in WESTLAW, PTLDOGN database, 1996 WL 11394164; see 22 U.S.C.A. § 262k-2 (Cum. Ann.
Pocket Part 1997).
3. See generally ASMA EL DAREER, WOMAN, WHY Do You WEEP? (1982); FRAN P. HOSKEN, THE HOsKEN
REPORT: GENITAL AND SEXUAL MUnLATION OF FEMALES (1983); HANNY JGHTFOOT-KLEIN, PRISONERS OF RrrUAL:
AN ODYSSEY INTO FEmALE GENITAL CIRCUMCISION (1989); NAHID TOuin, FEMALE GENrrAL MUTmATON: A CALL
FOR GLOBAL ACTION (1995).
4. 1have chosen to call this practice FGM because it is the name most consistent with the outcome of the
practice. Although some commentators believe this appellation is judgmental, my intention is not to pass judgment.
I do not judge the women who perform FGM, for I believe their intentions are honorable. Although I respect the
women who practice FGM, I do not believe that euphemistically naming the practice "surgery" or "circumcision" is
accurate. FGM is not medically necessary, and rarely occurs in surgical settings. Moreover, characterizing FGM as
circumcision significantly disguises the reality of the procedure: unlike male circumcision, FGM involves the cutting
and or removal of the female sex organs.
5. See TOUBIA, supra note 3, at 21 (FGM was practiced by the Phoenicians, Hittites, and the ancient
Egyptians); see also Kay Boulware-Miller, Female Circumcision: Challengesto the Practiceas a Human Rights
Violation, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L. 155, 156 n.3 (1985).
6. See TOUBIA, supra note 3, at 9-11.
7. See Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female GenitalMutilation": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and
the Culture Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 5 (1995).
8. See id.
9. See TOUBIA, supra note 3, at 10.
10. See id. at 9-11.
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approximately 85 percent of all FGM," in regions where infibulation is practiced, it
is practiced nearly universally. 2
All three procedures can have significant short and long term complications. These
complications include excessive bleeding and hemorrhaging, anemia, infection,
septicemia, tetanus, retention of urine and menstrual blood, psychological stress,
shock, permanent damage to urethra or anus, repeated bladder and urinary tract
infections, development of excessive scar tissue, permanent disfigurement, cyst
formation, infertility, extreme menstrual pain, pain during sexual intercourse,
difficulty achieving sexual satisfaction, recutting for intercourse and child-birth (if
infibulated), and death (from excessive bleeding and infection). 3
Despite its serious health consequences, FGM is very common. Approximately
130 million women and girls are already genitally mutilated. 4 "[G]lobally, at least
2 million girls a year are at risk of genital mutilation-approximately 6,000 per
day.' ' 15 Depending on the region where
practiced, the ritual may take place at any age
6
from infancy to young adulthood.'
FGM is practiced in approximately forty countries around the world, including at
least twenty-six African countries, where it is most common. 17 It is also practiced on
the Arabian Peninsula, in Oman and Yemen, and by small ethnic minorities in India,
Malaysia, and Indonesia." FGM also occurs in immigrant communities throughout
the world, including in the United States, Europe, and Australia. 9
Because some African Muslim communities cite religion as the reason for
performing FGM, the practice is often mistakenly identified with Islam. FGM,
however, is not a religious practice. Orthodox (Coptic) Christians, Ethiopian Falashas
(Jews who live in Israel), and Muslims' practice FGM, even though the Bible, 2' the
Torah,22 and the Quran23 do not require the practice.
Rather than being a religious practice, FGM is a cultural ritual employed to
prepare girls for their role as women, and to initiate girls into womanhood.'

11.

Seeid. at lO.

12. See id. at 11, 25 (Infibulation occurs most frequently and predominates in coastal Ethiopia, Djibouti,
northern Sudan, Somalia, and southern Egypt. Infibulation also occurs, though less frequently, in Eritrea, Gambia,
and Mali.).
13. See id. at 13-19.
14. See id. at5.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 9. In some cultures, the ritual takes place in young adulthood when the girl is of marriageable
age, often between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. See id. However, it is more common for girls to undergo FGM
between the ages of four and twelve. See id.
17. Seeid. at21.
18. See id. at 26.
19. Id. It is also important to note that FGM has occurred in the United States and England in non-immigrant
communities. "(A]s recently as the 1940s and 1950s, [FGM was used] to 'treat' hysteria, lesbianism, masturbation,
and other so-called female deviances." Id. at 21.
20. See id. at 31-32.
21. See id. at 32.
22. See id.
23. See id.
at 31; see also Islam in Perspective: Female Circumcision,ARAB NEws, Mar. 4, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, MOCLIPS File.
24. See TouBIA, supra note 3, at 9; see also AuCE WALKER & PRATiBHA PARMAR, WARRIOR MARKS: FEMALE
GENrrAL MUImLATION AND THE SEXUAL BLINDING OF WOMEN 244,246 (1993) (in an interview with Alice Walker,

Efua Dorkenoo described FGM as a "social practice" and tradition).
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Although FGM is described as an initiation ritual, in most cases the ritual takes place
long before puberty and the onset of menses, 5 and occasionally the ritual does occur
in infancy. However, the ritual most often takes place at an age when girls "can be
made aware of the social role expected of them as women."' 2 6Indeed, festivities and
other rituals that celebrate womanhood and the passage into womanhood often
accompany the cutting ritual. More specifically, in western Africa, the ritual cutting
occurs within "secret societies," which simultaneously provide formal training and
education about the role of women in society.27
In addition to educating girls about their role as women, many other reasons are
given for the practice of FGM, including: "ensuring the virginity of a woman before
marriage and inducing chastity for divorced women or married women whose
husbands are away; birth control; initiation into and celebration of womanhood;
hygienic reasons; and religious requirements."' Nahid Toubia characterizes the
reasons given for the practice of FGM as motivated by: (1) notions of beauty and
cleanliness; (2) desire for male protection/approval; (3) health concerns; (4) religion;
and (5) morality.29 Because the reasons for FGM are both important and traditional
to members of the practicing society, failure to undergo FGM can have serious social
and economic consequences for young women. Young girls who do not undergo
FGM are ostracized,3" and are often unable to marry?' Inability to marry can have
devastating economic consequences because
"marriage is a primary path to social and
32
economic survival and advancement.,
III.

ERADICATING FGM: ALTERNATIVES TO CULTURAL
IMPERIALISM AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM
Although FGM is a common practice affecting vast numbers of women and girls,
it is not universally condoned. Commentators from the West and, more significantly,
from within the cultures that practice FGM, have criticized the practice.33 According

25. See TOUBIA, supra note 3, at 9.
26. Id. Note, however, that the "socializing" role of FGM may be lost on girls in cultures that perform FGM
at an early age. See Brennan, supra note 1,at 389-90.
27. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 6 (I Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995) (the purpose of the secret
societies is "to inculcate young women on their socially-imposed roles."); see also TOUBIA, supra note 3, at 29;
Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and MulticulturalFeminism: The Case of Female
Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 189, 218 (1991-1992); Lewis, supra note 7, at 4 (FGM rituals
involve "educational and socialization rites.").
28. Gunning, supra note 27, at 195-96; see Boulware-Miller, supra note 5,at 157 (FGM is seen as increasing
fertility and live births, improving women's hygiene and the "aesthetic condition of female genitalia," and enhancing
male sexual pleasure).
29. See TOUBIA, supra note 3, at 37.
30. See AMINA WARSAME, FEMALE CIRCUMCISION: STRATEGIES TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE (Proceedings of

the International Seminar on Female Circumcision), June 13-16, 1988, quoted in TOUBIA, supra note 3,at 41; see
also WALKER & PARMAR, supranote 24, at 322.
31. See TOUBIA, supra note 3, at 6, 37. "The practice is... a prerequisite for marriage. To ensure that the
woman's family receives the requisite bride price from the groom's family, the bride must be able to prove that she
has undergone female genital mutilation." DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ALERT SERIES: WOMEN: FEMALE GENITAL

MUTILATION 3 (1994) [hereinafter ALERT SERIES].
32. Boulware-Miller, supra note 5, at 157-58.
33. The Somali Democratic Women's Organization, the Senegal "Le Mouvement Femmes et Societe," the
Union Nationale des Femmes du Mali, the Babiker Bedri Foundation for Women's Studies and Research in Sudan,
the Egyptian Society for the Prevention of Traditional Practices Harmful to Women and Children, and the Association
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to Nahid Toubia, Sudan's first female surgeon, FGM "is an extreme example of
efforts common to societies around the world to manipulate women's sexuality,
ensure their subjugation, and control their reproductive functions."' But this is not
the perspective of Toubia alone. Indeed, both men and women in cultures that
practice FGM understand that FGM has "patriarchal underpinnings" and that FGM
is one way "in which women come to accept their secondary status."35 Armed with
this knowledge, as well as knowledge of the physical and psychological damage that
FGM can cause, women inside and outside Africa, particularly in Europe and the
United States, began efforts to eliminate FGM.
When worldwide attention first focused on FGM in the 1970s and 1980s, criticism
originating in the West was experienced quite differently than criticism from within
countries that practice FGM. African communities perceived the criticism leveled by
western feminists and western media as particularly intrusive, sensationalized, and
reckless. 36 The legacy of colonialism, combined with arrogant and condescending
criticism from abroad, made Africans hesitant to work with western women with
similar goals. Indeed, many African organizations specifically suggested
37 that any
efforts to confront the practice of FGM must be made only by Africans.
African women excluded western women from the process of eradicating FGM
partially out of a sense of pride in their people and culture. 38 African women also
excluded western women because westerners judged this cultural practice as
"barbaric" without considering the value FGM served in African communities. 39 In
"essentializing" womanhood, 4' western women did not address the politics and

of African Women in Research and Development, are all indigenous groups who denounce FGM. See Brennan, supra
note 1, at 378 n.56. Moreover, as of May 1987, the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices "developed
national committees in fourteen countries ....
These countries are: Benin, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana,
Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Togo." Id.
34. ToutIA,supra note 3, at 5. Another commentator explains:
Mutilating a woman's genitalia is used as a tool to ensure her virginity and later [the woman's]
marital fidelity ....Female genital mutilation also furthers the patriarchal interest of maintaining
the purity of a man's blood line by ensuring that his wife's children are indisputably his. To
achieve these ends, men find it necessary to dominate women and control the sexual and
reproductive behavior of each woman. This form of sexual politics also ensures that women are
subordinated and helpless in a society dominated by men.
Daliah Setareh, Recent Developments: Women Escaping GenitalMutilation Seeking Asylum in the United States, 6
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 129-30 (1995).
35. TouBtA, supra note 3,at 35; see WALKER & PARMAR, supra note 24, at 248-49, 252-53 (interview with
Efua Dorkenoo).
36. See TOUBIA, supra note 3, at 5-6.
37. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 10.
38. See Gunning, supra note 27, at 224.
39. See Nancy Kim, Toward A Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western
Imperialism and UncriticalAbsolutism,25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 49, 99 (1993). Kim states:
In the 1970s, many western feminists condemned the practice of female sexual surgeries as a
barbaric way for males to control the sexuality of women. They refused to recognize the cultural
purposes served by the practice. As a result, many African feminists were forced to choose
between ending sexual surgeries and maintaining loyalty to their culture. While they may have
wanted to end the practice, many were, and are, unwilling to end it for the purposes set forth by
western feminists.
Id.
40. Gender essentialism is "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and
described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience." Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialismin Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990). Richard Delgado explains gender
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conditions of the struggle of African women. As a result, the concerns of western
feminists did not ring true to African women."'
Even African women who oppose the practice [of FGM] often resent what they
perceive as condescension from [w]estern feminists who seek to end all African
women's problems by crusading against this one practice. Western feminists
often fail to realize that although sexual and reproductive freedoms are central
to their feminist struggles, health, food, education, and childcare may figure
more centrally in the struggles of other women.42
The failure of western feminists to see the broader context in which FGM occurs,
particularly the broader socio-economic context, alienated western feminists from
African women with the same goal. This failure to understand and to communicate
across cultures raises challenging questions for those who believe that women and
girls should not be subjected to mutilation of their sexual organs. Must westerners
adopt a culturally relativistic perspective? Is silent criticism the only appropriate
response? Or can westerners, and western nations, respond to this practice in a way
that is respectful of women and girls' physical and psychological health, as well as
respectful of the cultures in which FGM is practiced? "The crucial issue is how to
strike a balance between respect for cultural diversity (and the containment of
'
cultural imperialism) and the attainment of human dignity for women."43
Westerners must strike this balance on a variety of planes: on a personal,
individual level; on the level of international cooperation; and as sovereign nations.
As individuals, those concerned with eradicating FGM should adopt the "world-

essentialism as follows:
This approach obscures the identities and submerges the perspectives of women who differ from
the norm. Not only does legal theory built on essentialist foundations marginalize and render
certain groups invisible, it falls prey to the trap of over-abstraction .... It also promotes hierarchy
and silencing, evils that women should, and do, seek to subvert.
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo'sSixth Chronicle:Intersections, Essences,and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 639, 644-45 (1993).
Just as an essentialist framework for analysis and action in United States jurisprudence results in negative
consequences, gender essentialism in the context of FGM has had, and will continue to have, alienating consequences.
Mar Matsuda poses "multiple consciousness" as an alternative to essentialism. See Mar J. Matsuda, When the First
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L REP. 7, 9 (1989). Multiple
consciousness is
a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. That world is accessible
to all of us. We should know it in its concrete particulars. We should know of our sister carrying
buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel, our sister trembling at 3 am. in a
shelter for battered women, our sisters holding bloodied children in their arms in Cape Town, on
the West Bank, and in Nicaragua.
Id.
And we should know of our sisters in Sierra Leone singing to quell their young daughters' screams during their
ritualized entry into womanhood. See Note, What's Culture Got to Do With It: Excising the Harmful Tradition of
Female Circumcision, 106 HARVARD L REV. 1944, 1948 n.37 (1993) (quoting OLAYINKA KOSO-THOMAS, THE
CIRCUMCISION OF WOMEN: A STRAT*_Y FOR ERADICAION 22 (1987)). "Holding on to a multiple consciousness will
allow us to operate both within the abstractions of standard jurisprudential discourse, and within... details of our
own special knowledge," thereby avoiding the inappropriate and damaging imposition of one world view onto others.
Matsuda, supra, at 9.
41. Margareth Etienne, Addressing Gender-BasedViolence in an InternationalContext, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S
L.J. 139, 162 (1995).
42. Id.
43. Kim, supra note 39, at 85-86.

Summer 1997]

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION

travelling" approach advocated by Isabelle R. Gunning.44 Achieving this balance in
the context of international organizations requires leadership from the regions where
FGM occurs, as well as patient cooperation from other regions. Finally, as a
sovereign nation, the United States must adopt a refugee-friendly policy protective
of individual women and girls at risk of non-consensual, forced FGM.
The Individual Level: "World-Travelling"
World-travelling describes an approach to be used by individuals concerned with
practices like FGM, but who also are concerned with maintaining respect for other
cultures and perspectives. "The [world-travelling] methodology is a process to use
in perceiving and understanding [culturally challenging45] practices within their
cultural context and relies upon a multicultural dialogue as a way to encourage the
evolution of more shared values." ' The world-travelling method involves adopting
three different perspectives: (1) seeing oneself in historical context; (2) seeing oneself
as the "other" sees you; and (3) seeing the "other" in her own context. The point of
adopting the three perspectives is to evaluate ourselves before evaluating others, and
to enhance recognition of both our independence from others, as well as our
interconnectedness.
Seeing oneself in historical context means that western feminists must recognize
that FGM has been performed in our home countries as well as in non-western
countries. Moreover, western feminists also must recognize that the hierarchical
ordering of sexuality and gender achieved by FGM is achieved in the United States
as successfully as in FGM-countries, if by different means (such as elective cosmetic
surgery).47 Similarly, seeing oneself as the "other" sees you, involves recognition that
African feminists may find "[w]estern articulations of concern ... as only thinly
disguised expressions of racial and cultural superiority and imperialism."'t4 This, of
course, results from the West's history of imperialism and racism. Finally, seeing the
"other" in her own context requires "understanding that any single event or norm is
a part of a larger, complex, organic social environment."4 9 Grasping the complexity
of the social environment surrounding FGM involves identifying practices in our own
culture that would be challenging or negative to others, and absorbing all of the detail
surrounding the practices we find challenging elsewhere. Adopting this worldtravelling approach as individuals will enhance our understanding of other cultures,
and prevent us from imposing our own views on others in a condescending and selfrighteous manner.
A.

44. See Gunning, supra note 27.

45. See id at 191 n.8 ("Mhe term 'culturally challenging' ... describe[s] any practice that someone outside
the culture would view as 'negative'.....
46. Id. at 193.
47. Facelifts, liposuction, breast implants, and other forms of cosmetic surgery are "intended to fix culturally
perceived 'problems."' Lewis, supra note 7, at n.27; see Gunning, supranote 27, at 213-15; Alison T. Slack, Female
Circumcision:A CriticalAppraisal, 10 HUM. RTS.Q. 437, 463-64 (1988). The pervasiveness of eating disorders
among women and girls in the United States is another manifestation of gender ordering.
48. Gunning, supra note 27, at 212.
49. Id. at 213.
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B.

The InternationalLevel: Balancing Cultural Respect with Women's Rights
Adoption of an international approach 50 to eradicating FGM, spearheaded by
leaders from the regions where FGM is practiced, implicitly rejects cultural
relativism. Cultural relativism is no longer a defensible response to complicated,
ethical, and cultural issues because it fails "to recognize the difference between
cultural sensitivity and cultural stagnation attributable to power imbalances within
societies .... The relativist approach to culture, which is an absolutist one, does not
consider minority viewpoints and beliefs that coexist with and are subsumed within
the dominant 'culture' or social group."5' Proponents of cultural relativism fail to
recognize that
culture is not a static, unchanging, identifiable body of information, against
which human rights may be measured for compatibility and applicability. Rather,
culture is a series of constantly contested and negotiated social practices whose
meanings are influenced by the power and status of their interpreters and
participants .... We must acknowledge change, complexity, and interpretive
privilege in cultural formation to avoid reductionism, essentialism, and rhetorical
rigidity.52
Thus, while those interested in protecting the human rights of women must interpret
challenging practices with sensitivity, they also must be cautious of simple cultural
rationalizations for those practices. This is particularly important because "no social
group has suffered greater violation of its human rights in the name of culture than
women. Regardless of the particular forms it takes in different societies, the concept

50. International efforts to eliminate FGM have focused on public education on the negative health
consequences of FGM. See ToLuBt, supra note 3, at 6. For example, since 1979, the World Health Organization has
held conferences and seminars on traditional practices, including FGM, that are harmful to the health of girls and
women. See HOSKEN, supra note 3, at 42 n.l. "[C]ertain groups have focused on 'the right to health' and health
education as the most appropriate human rights approach to FG[M] because it is believed to cause the least offense
to practicing cultures." Lewis, supra note 7, at 19; see Boulware-Miller, supra note 5, at 164-65; Slack, supra note
47, at 479-81.
However, according to Lewis, there are limits to this health-focused approach:
First, many cultures condone practices that are physically painful or create health risks to children
where the procedures are believed to be medically or socially necessary. Second, defenders of
FG[M] may suspect that the 'health' approach masks [w]estern imperialism in a more palatable
guise. Finally, critics point out that a health-based approach may result in reforms whereby FG[M]
would continue to be performed, but under hygienic conditions and with anesthesia. To avoid this,
many [w]estern feminists argue that FG[M] must be defined as a human rights violation,
regardless of the conditions under which it is performed.
Lewis, supra note 7, at 19. For instance, international organizations and western feminists have argued that FGM
violates such internationally recognized human rights as the rights of the child, the right to sexual and corporeal
integrity, the right to health, and the prohibition against torture and slavery. See Gunning, supra note 27, at 231-37
(describing the types of human rights arguments that have been made by others). However, human rights arguments
are not without their problems. First, they are technically difficult to make successfully, and second, "the punitive
aspects of the [human rights] system as a legal system" may not "preserve multicultural respect." Id. at 238. Indeed,
it was arguments alleging that FGM violates human rights norms that initially outraged activists from countries where
FGM is practiced. This dilemma brings us full circle to the core question: how do we condemn human rights
violations without condemning an entire culture? Naming a particular practice as a human rights violation while
simultaneously recognizing its cultural value and underpinnings is perhaps the first step in this delicate endeavor.
Over time, innate human creativity will find culturally-fulfilling replacements for damaging cultural practices.
51. Kim, supra note 39, at 103.
52. Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse, in WOMEN'S
RIGHTS HuMAN RIGHTS 167, 172-73 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
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of culture in the modem state circumscribes women's lives in deeply symbolic as
well as immediately real ways." 3 Just as "[t]he resort to cultural explanations of
women's status is usually defensive, combative, and specifically designed to placate
an international audience," so too are cultural explanations of challenging practices
directed at women.
In order to avoid the shortcomings of a purely relativist approach, in which FGM
is justified by its value solely as a cultural practice, international organizations might
adopt a balancing test similar to the test used by the United Nations Working Group
on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children (Working
Group).55 The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and the Protection of Minorities (Sub-Commission) created the Working Group
specifically to study FGM. 56 The Working Group weighed the contemporary "cultural
significance [of female circumcision] against the harmful consequences [of FGM]."57
Thus, the Working Group balanced the physical and psychological consequences to
women and girls against the two identified cultural functions of FGM: as a ritual
passage into womanhood and as a test of a girl's capacity to endure acute suffering
and cope with the future pain of childbirth.58 Based on this balancing, and its
assessment that these cultural functions were obsolete, 9 the Working Group
determined that the cultural value of FGM was outweighed by the need to protect the
physical and psychological health of women and girls." This balancing approach is
valuable because of its honesty within the cultural contours of the societies in
question: the contemporary cultural value of FGM is considered, but is not

53. Id. at 169.
54. Id.
55. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 387, 378 n.56. The United Nations Working Group on Traditional Practices
Affecting the Health of Women and Children (Working Group)
was made up of two [United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
the Protection of Minorities (Sub-Commission)] members and representatives from three United
Nation agencies, UNICEF, UNESCO, and WHO. The Sub-Commission appointed an African
woman, Halima Embarek Sarzazi of Morocco; who served as chairperson of the group, and
Musidhar Bhindare of India.... Several representatives of non-governmental organizations also
participated.
Id. at 381 n.68. Thus, the Working Group represented a truly international body under the direction of a woman from
a region where FGM is practiced.
56. See id. at 387.
57. Gunning, supra note 27, at 243.
58. See id.
59. See Brennan, supranote 1, at 389-90.
Changes in the practice have rendered these functions obsolete .... The operations generally are
no longer done at puberty; they are done in infancy or early childhood. This change deprives the
operation of its initiatory function because the girls are too young to appreciate the significance
of the ritual .... The use of modem medical techniques also deprives the practice of its other
function within traditional societies testing the girls' capacity to cope with pain.
Id.
60. Significantly, once the Working Group determined that FGM was a violation of human rights, it "decided
to support the internal African eradication efforts through education and persuasion. [It] did not attempt to embarrass
or coerce the governments of countries in which female circumcision is practiced into taking positive steps to prohibit
female circumcision." See id. at 382. Thus, the Working Group likely avoided the resistance that early western
feminists experienced when they condemned the practice of FGM.
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presumptively more valuable than women's health, as it effectively would be under
the cultural relativist model.6'
C.

The Domestic Level: GrantingAsylum
Completely distinct from any questions regarding the propriety of western
involvement or intervention in African culture is the question of whether or not the
practice of FGM can satisfy the persecution requirement for asylum or withholding
of deportation within United States immigration law. What distinguishes treatment
of FGM in the context of asylum from attempts to eradicate its practice abroad is that
granting asylum is a manifestation of United States culture and jurisprudence, within
United States territory.62 United States Immigration Judges have recognized that
granting asylum under domestic law does not interfere with the domestic, cultural
affairs of another State.63 Granting asylum is not meant to be an unfriendly act:
It is important to understand that, in recognizing gender-based asylum claims,
... the United States [clourts are not creating any standard of behavior for other
societies. Rather, we are creating the standard by which this country will serve
as a refuge for women who are being persecuted because of their gender."
Given the parallel and pressing imperatives of respecting the cultures of other
States; non-interference with other States;65 and the desire to eradicate practices that
are physically, psychologically, and socially damaging to women (whether or not we
define such challenging cultural practices as human rights violations), the granting
of asylum in FGM-based persecution cases is appropriate. By granting asylum in
cases of persecution taking the form of FGM, the United States will neither interfere
with the internal affairs of other States, nor impose its cultural values on any group

61. Moreover, a balancing test avoids cultural relativism's overly-simphstic trap of labeling States as either
protectors or violators of human rights.
When a government exempts itself from the perceived cultural hegemony of human rights
doctrine, its supporters as well as its detractors participate in perpetuating a false oppositional
dichotomy in which... cultures are collapsed into two falsely unified packages, one bearing the
stamp of human rights and the other lacking it.
Rao, supra note 52, at 168.
62. This is consistent with the territorial principle of jurisdiction under international law, which allows a State
to assert and exercise jurisdiction over all individuals within its territory, whether or not they are the State's nationals.
See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1051 (3d ed. 1993).

63. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 21 (IJArlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995).
64. Id. While United States statutory law does not explicitly address this point, Article 1(2) of the
Organization of African Unity Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa confirms that "the
Grant of Asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act."
U.N.T.S. 14691, effective June 20, 1974, reprintedin GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

431 (2d ed. 1996). Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees confirmned "the peaceful, non-political and
exclusively humanitarian nature of [a] grant of asylum or [a] recognition of the status of refugee" and underlined "the
importance of the internationally accepted principle that nothing in either shall be interpreted as an unfriendly act
towards the country of origin of refugees." OAS/Ser.LV/II.66, doc. 10, rev. 1. reprintedin GOODWIN-GILL, supra,
at 446.

65. See, e.g., Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 8, 49 Stat. 3097 (1933) ("No
[S]tate has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."). The Preamble to the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations also declares that "strict observance by States of the obligation not to intervene in
the affairs of any other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace ....
G.A.Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121 (1970).
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of people that remains within its own culture. Yet, by granting asylum, the United
States will help persecuted individuals who seek assistance and protection, while also
contributing to the development of an international customary norm against FGM.
While an international customary norm prohibiting FGM does not currently exist,
granting asylum in cases involving FGM contributes to the ongoing international
dialogue regarding this practice." Although the United Nations has declared that
FGM is a violation of human rights,67 a number of States have outlawed its practice,6
and both the United States and Canada have granted asylum and suspension of
deportation premised on FGM-based persecution,69 France recently denied asylum
to Aminata Diop, a Malian woman who refused to undergo FGM. 7' As a result, the
practice of States is currently not sufficiently consistent and wide-spread to constitute
a norm of customary international law. If over time, however, States consistently
grant asylum in cases involving FGM, then States that allow FGM will be under
pressure to eradicate the practice. Although waiting for an international customary
norm to develop requires patience, it is a culturally appropriate way to proceed. For
if an international customary norm develops, it will represent the view of the world
community that FGM violates human rights, and will not represent further western
cultural imperialism.

66. According to one source:
The asylum determination process is one of the few [United States] domestic fore in which human
rights principles are recognized and elaborated .... [T]he gender Guidelines [issued by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1991] and their legacies, including [In re
Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 12, 1996), in which the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
granted asylum based on FGM,] and other decisions, are having a direct effect on the underlying
human rights abuses that form the basis of women's claims. Thus .... it is those who advocate
asylum rights and the equal and fair treatment of all by our legal system who are beginning to
direct attention to the causes of refugee flows, and who in the end will most effectively help to
"prevent" them.
The BIA 's New Asylum JurisprudenceAnd Its Relevance For Women's Claims, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1173,
1174 (Sept. 9, 1996) [hereinafter New Asylum Jurisprudence].
67. See ALERT SERIES, supra note 31, at 5-6. In reaching this conclusion, the United States Department of
Justice quoted the International Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in stating that "violence
against women both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental
freedoms" and that "[v]iolence against women shall be understood to encompass ... female genital mutilation." Id.
at 6 (quoting G.A. Res. 48/104, preamble and art. 2, adopted on Dec. 20, 1993); see also U.N. Sub-Comm'n on the
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities Res. 1988/34, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1988/45 at 62
(1988) (discussed in Brennan, supra note 1, at 392).
68. Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, the Sudan, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland have either
outlawed or restricted FGM. See Mary Ann James, Recent Development, FederalProhibition of Female Genital
Mutilation: The Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1993, H.R. 3247, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 206 (1994).
Australia, Canada, and France apply existing laws to ban FGM. See id. Recent federal statutory law makes it a crime
in the United States to knowingly circumcise, excise, or infibulate any female under the age of 18. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 116 (Cum. Ann. Pocket Part 1997).
69. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 12, 1996); In re M.K., No. A72-374-558 (U Arlington,
Va., Aug. 9, 1995); In re Oluloro, No. A72-147-491 (IJPortland, Or., March 23, 1994); In re Salim, discussed in
Randy Furst, A Child Is Spared; Family Escapes Deportation,Their Daughter'sRitual Mutilation, STAR TRIB., Mar.
25, 1994, at IB, available in WESTLAW, STTRMSP database, 1994 WL 8441270. According to Lewis, Canada
granted refugee status to Khadra Hassan Fara, a Somali woman who feared that her daughter would be forced to
undergo FGM if they were sent back to Somalia. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 53.
70. Aminata Diop's case was discussed in Lewis, supranote 7, at 53, and in WALKER & PARMAR, supra note
24, at 255-57.
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FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AS PERSECUTION FOR
PURPOSES OF ASYLUM CLAIMS
z

Overview of Recent CasesAddressing FGM as Persecution7
Six72 United States Immigration Courts and the Board
of Immigration Appeals74
73
(BIA) have addressed the question of whether asylum, suspension of deportation,
or with-holding of deportation," should be granted on the basis of FGM. Although
I will discuss the requirements of asylum in great detail in the remainder of this
Comment, suffice it to say here that to qualify for a discretionary grant of asylum, a
petitioner must prove that she is a refugee.76 A refugee is a person outside her country
of origin (or last place of habitual residence) who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail herself of the protection of, her country of origin,

A.

71. A person can seek asylum in two ways: (1) affirmatively upon arrival in the United States, or (2) as a
defense to removal from the United States. In an affimative petition, an asylum seeker's claim will first be considered
by an Asylum Officer. See Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R., § 208.9(a) (1997). The Asylum Officer may grant
asylum, see id. § 208.9(e), but has no power to deny asylum, see id.
§ 208.14(b). If the Asylum Officer does not grant
asylum, the petitioner's case will be considered by an Immigration Judge. The Immigration Judge's decision can be
appealed to the BIA, the Circuit Court of Appeals, and ultimately, to the United States Supreme Court.
An individual also can claim asylum as a defense in removal proceedings. See id.§ 208.4. Although, the
requirements are the same as above, this claimant will not go before an Asylum Officer, but will begin her
proceedings before an Immigration Judge. The process of appealing an denial of asylum is identical in both types of
claims.
For a discussion of the precedential value of immigration decisions, see infra notes 89, 105, and 182.
72. 1 will only discuss five of these six immigration cases in any detail. Although the Nigerian woman's claim
for asylum in the sixth case, In re H.O., No. A71-962-191 (U Arlington, Va., Sept. 18, 1995), was based on her own
past experience of FGM and on the possible future infliction of FGM on her daughter, the facts were so murky that
the case does not reveal any real developments in the adjudication of women's asylum claims. See New Asylum
Jurisprudence, supra note 66, at 1181.
73. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994) (An "alien may be granted asylum
in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the
meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A), [8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1994)]; see also infra notes 113-114 and
accompanying text for a refugee definition.
74. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994). Like asylum, suspension of deportation
is a discretionary form of relief from deportation. See id.
§ 1254(a). Suspension may be granted in three sets of
circumstances, each with slightly varying requirements. See id.In the case of petitioners who are deportable because
of violations of federal law, the United States Attorney General may, but is not obligated to, grant suspension if: (1)
the petitioner has been continuously physically present in the United States for not less than seven years; and, (2) the
petitioner is a person of good moral character and was of good moral character during the entire time he or she was
present in the United States; and, (3) the deportation would cause extreme hardship to the petitioner, or the
petitioner's United States citizen (or legal permanent resident) spouse, parent, or child. See id. § 1254(a)(1). For
otherwise deportable aliens who are victims of battery or extreme cruelty at the hands of their United States citizen
(or legal permanent resident) spouse or parent, the physical presence requirement is shortened to three years. See id.
§ 1254(a)(3). The other requirements remain the same. See id.
However, in the case of petitioners who are deportable
because they committed certain enumerated criminal offenses, they failed to register, they falsified documents, or they
are threats to national security, the requirements for suspension are increased. See id. § 1254(a)(2). In addition to the
same requirement of good moral character during their physical presence in the United States, these petitioners must
have been continuously present for not less than ten years, and the deportation must result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship, rather than "extreme hardship." See id.
75. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994) Unlike asylum and suspension of
deportation, withholding of deportation is not discretionary. See id. § 1253(h)(1). Rather, "[tihe Attorney General
shall not deport or return any alien.., to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." Id. (emphasis added).
76. See id.§ 1158(a).
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because she has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
In In re Oluloro, Lydia Omowunmi Oluloro, a Nigerian woman, was granted
suspension of deportation because of the extreme hardship her two United States
citizen children would face if she was deported to Nigeria. In that case, the
Immigration Judge (UI) held that the risk of FGM being performed on Oluloro' s two
daughters constituted extreme hardship.7 8 In order to avoid such hardship, the U
granted suspension of deportation."
Similarly, in In re Salim, an U in Bloomington, Indiana granted suspension of
deportation to a Palestinian couple because their United States citizen daughter
would face extreme hardship if they were deported to Saudi Arabia.' ° The U agreed
that Layla-Salim, the couple's seven year old daughter, would be "subjected to
extreme hardship in the form of female circumcision" if she were deported to Saudi
Arabia, despite her parents opposition to the practice. 8'
In In re M. K., the U granted asylum under section 208(a) of the federal
Immigration and Nationality Act82 to a woman who resisted mutilation for nearly ten
years, and who ran away from her home and family to avoid FGM, but who was later
abducted and forced to undergo FGM.83 The U considered both asylum and
suspension as potential relief from deportation. In this case, the FGM had already
been performed on the petitioner, and there was no child or woman to protect from
future infliction of FGM. Thus, suspension of deportation would have been
inappropriate because there was no extreme hardship arising out of the deportation.
While there was no future threat of extreme hardship to a child, as there was in
Salim, the U in M.K. found there was sufficient evidence of the likelihood of future
persecution to warrant a granting of asylum?8 Moreover, in M.K., the IJ found that
the circumstances of M.K.'s mutilation were so serious as to warrant a granting of
asylum based on humanitarian concerns.85

77. See id. § I101(a)(42)(A).
78. See In re Oluloro, No. A72-147-491, at 17 (IJPortland, Or., Mar. 23, 1994).
79. See id. at 19.
80. See In re Salim, discussedin Furst, supra note 69.

81. See id.
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994).
83. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 7 (U Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995).
84. See id. at 23.
85. See id. In cases where future persecution is unlikely because conditions in the country of origin have
changed, a showing of "severe past persecution" is required for asylum eligibility. See, e.g., In re H., Int. Dec. 3276
(BIA 1996); In re Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989). In the case of M.K., the Immigration Judge (U) did not
specifically find that past infliction of FGM amounted to the "severe past persecution" required for a discretionary
grant of asylum in cases where there is little likelihood of future persecution because conditions in the country of
origin have changed. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558 (I Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995). However, such a finding
of severe past persecution was unnecessary because the U also concluded that country conditions had not changed.
See id. Thus, the seriousness of M.K.'s persecution, and the lack of changed conditions in her country, were so
compelling as to warrant a grant of humanitarian relief. See id.
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In the remaining two cases, In re J.86 and In re Kasinga,87 the Us denied relief
based on FGM. In In re J., the I considered an asylum petition based on fear of
88
FGM being performed on the petitioner's children if they returned to Sierra Leone.
Despite remarkably similar circumstances to those in In re M.K., the U in this case
rejected the petition.89 As in In re M.K., the petitioner was from Sierra Leone, was
abducted and forced to undergo FGM, and was forced, on pain of death, to swear
silence regarding her treatment.' Although the U in M.K.'s case found this amounted
to persecution, the U in In re J.did not agree and J.'s asylum petition was denied.
Finally, in In re Kasinga, the teen-age petitioner fled her homeland of Togo in
order to avoid imminent, forced genital mutilation and an arranged, polygamous
marriage.9 Even though FGM is essentially compulsory among Kasinga's tribe in
Togo, she was able to avoid FGM until the age of seventeen because her father was
92
a wealthy and powerful man who did not believe in the practice. When her father
died, the petitioner's aunt arranged her marriage to a man who already had three
other wives.93 Kasinga objected to the marriage, and refused to sign the marriage
certificate. 4 Shortly after the official marriage ceremony, and just prior to her
scheduled "circumcision," Kasinga's sister helped her escape to Ghana, where
Kasinga took the first flight out of the country. 95 After a few months in Germany,
%
Kasinga came to the United States, where she had relatives, in order to seek asylum.
Despite these compelling circumstances, the U denied Kasinga's request for
asylum.97 He did not find her testimony credible; rather, he found her testimony to
98
be irrational, inconsistent, and inherently unpersuasive. While this finding may be

86. No. A72-370-565 (U Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reported in More on lJ Decision GrantingAsylum
Based on Genital Mutilation,72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1265 (Sept. 18, 1995) [hereinafter More on lJ Decision],
and in Still More on Asylum Claims Relating to Female GenitalMutilation, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1375 (Oct.
6, 1995) [hereinafter Still More on Asylum Claims].
87. No. A73-476-695 (U Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 25, 1995). Note, however, that the BIA overturned the U's
decision and granted asylum. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 12, 1996), at 11.
88. See In re J., No. A72-370-565 (U Baltimore, Md. Apr. 28, 1995), reported in More on If Decision, supra
note 86, at 1265, and in Still More on Asylum Claims, supra note 86, at 1375.
89. U decisions do not serve as binding precedent on either Asylum Officers or other Us, unless they are
designated and published. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) (1996). If no designated, published opinion controls an issue, Us
may decide similar cases in completely dissimilar fashions. See id. However, BIA decisions are binding on Asylum
Officers and Us. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1996). Thus, the BIA's decision in In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June
12, 1996), is particularly important because it compels all Asylum Officers and Us throughout the country to find that
FGM, as practiced by Kasinga's tribe, is persecution. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 12, 1996) at 15.
90. See In re J., No. A72-370-565 (i Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reportedin More on IJ Decision, supra
note 86, at 1265.
91. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 12, 1996), at 2-3.
92. See id. at 2.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 4.
95. See id. at 2.
96. See id. at 3.
97. See In re Kasinga, No. A72-476-695 (U Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 25, 1995), at 14.
98. See id. at 10. Yet, "[i]n finding Ms. Kasinga not credible, the judge relied upon non-existent
inconsistencies, and made incorrect assumptions about cultural norms in Togo." Applicant's Brief on Appeal From
Decision of the Immigration Judge at 2, In re Kasinga (No. A73-476-695). The U's finding that Kasinga lacked
credibility raises significant questions and highlights the difficulty of analyzing gender-based asylum claims. Although
a detailed discussion of the problems that arise in assessing credibility is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is
important to note that the U in the Kasinga case did not follow the recommendations contained in the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) guidelines regarding the evaluation of testimony of women asylum seekers. See
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attributed partially to Kasinga's devastatingly inadequate legal representation," it is
primarily attributable to the U who failed to take sufficient account of Kasinga's own
testimony."tu In addition to finding Kasinga's testimony incredible, the U also found
that: (1) Kasinga's fear of forced genital mutilation and forced polygamous marriage
upon return to Togo did not demonstrate past or future persecution; (2) even if there
were evidence of persecution, the persecution was not on account of one of the five
statutory grounds (specifically, Kasinga was not persecuted because of membership
in a particular social group); and (3) Kasinga failed to show government action or
acquiescence because she never approached the government for protection.'' The
BIA recently considered the Kasinga case on appeal, and granted Kasinga asylum
based on her membership in the particular social group of young women of her tribe
who have not had FGM and who oppose the practice.' 2
Prior to the BIA's decision in Kasinga, the outcomes in the FGM cases were
inconsistent because no precedent existed on the question of whether FGM is a form
of persecution. 3 The BIA in Kasinga held that the most severe form of FGM is
persecution.'0 4 This holding is significant because Kasinga is binding on all Asylum
Officers and Us throughout the country.'0 5 Now that the BIA has answered the
threshold question in these asylum cases by holding that FGM can amount to
persecution, future cases should be more consistent in their outcomes.t16

PHYLUIs COVEN, U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASYLUM OFFICERS ADJUDICATING ASYLUM CLAIMS

FROM WOMEN 6-7 (1995) [hereinafter CONSIDERATIONS]. In particular, the U in Kasinga failed to follow the
recommendations contained in the CONSIDERATIONS section entitled Demeanor/CredibilityIssues. See id. Although
this is disappointing, and perhaps inappropriate, the U's failure to apply the CONSIDERATIONS is not surprising.
[Because] the [CONSIDERATIONS are] directed only towards INS [A]sylum [O]fficers, [they have]
nothing more than persuasive value in the courts ....The [Us] who preside over the exclusion
or deportation merit hearings have broad discretion in adjudicating asylum cases and are not
subject to the same standards as INS (Alsylum [O]fficers. Consequently, women seeking to
contest their deportability by asserting an asylum claim based wholly or in part on their gender will
be heard by an [U] who may not have even read the suggestions in the [CONSIDERATIONS].
Setareh, supra note 34, at 153. Despite the fact that the CONSIDERATIONS were addressed only to Asylum Officers,
both the INS and the Immigration Courts are within the Department of Justice, the department that issued the
CONSIDERATIONS. If asylum policy is to be consistent, then both Us and Asylum Officers alike should apply the
CONSIDERATIONS. (The fact that Asylum Officers consider "affirmative' asylum applications and Us consider asylum
requests in removal proceedings should have no bearing on the application of the CONSIDERATIONS.).
99. See Applicant's Brief on Appeal From Decision of the Immigration Judge at 1-3, In re Kasinga (No. A73476-695).
100. The BIA later undertook an independent review of Kasinga's testimony and found that Kasinga's
'"estimony in support of her asylum application is plausible, detailed, and internally consistent. It is consistent with
her asylum application and with the substantial background information in the record." In re Kasinga, Int.
Dec. 3278,
at 7 (BIA June 12, 1996) (citation omitted).
101. See In re Kasinga, No. A73-476-695, at 11-12 (U Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 25, 1995).
102. See In re Kasinga, Int.
Dec. 3278, at 11.
103. The inconsistent outcomes are also the result of confusion regarding what constitutes membership in a
particular social group. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.b.
104. See In re Kasinga, Int.
Dec. 3278, at 11.
105. Although the published decisions of the BIA are binding on Asylum Officers and Us nationwide, asylum
cases may still be decided differently because of variations in the asylum case law of different circuits. See discussion
infra note 182.
106. On the other hand, the BIA's holding that FGM can amount to persecution does not end all inquiry.
Although the government's brief to the BIA requested that the BIA establish a general framework for evaluating all
asylum claims premised on FGM, the BIA declined the government's invitation and limited its holding to the facts
in the instant case. See Govermment's Brief in Response to Applicant's Appeal From Decision of Immigration Judge
at 15, In re Kasinga (No. A73-476-695); see also In re Kasinga, Int.
Dec. 3278, at 11 (BIA June 12, 1996) (Filppu,
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The BIA's holding that FGM may serve as the basis of asylum claims of women
and their female children was not completely surprising for a number of reasons.
First, the Government's Brief in Kasinga's appeal, rather than objecting to all asylum
claims based on FGM, was particularly moderate and argued only that "certain
potential victims of FGM may indeed establish eligibility for asylum and withholding
of deportation ..... ' Second, in 1995, the United States Department of Justice
issued its Considerationsfor Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From
Women," 8 which provide an international and comparative law back-drop for
analysis of gender based claims." 9 The Considerationsencourage Asylum Officers
to consider the CanadianGuidelines on Women Refugee ClaimantsFearingGenderRelated Persecution, Canadian immigration rulings, the United States High
Commissioneron Refugees Handbook (UNHCR Handbook) and other international
0
instruments when rendering decisions in gender-related claims." Moreover, the
Considerationsrecognize that breaching social mores, by marrying outside of an
arranged marriage, or by otherwise failing to comply with cultural or religious norms,
which would include refusing to undergo FGM, can result in persecution."' Given
the federal government's increasing willingness to recognized gender-based asylum
claims, it would have been difficult for the BIA to completely bar all asylum claims
based on FGM.
Satisfying the Elements of an Asylum Claim Based on FGM as Persecution
Under United States immigration law, asylum may be granted to a petitioner who,
by a preponderance of the evidence,"' satisfies the refugee definition set out in
section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act"' (INA). Under the INA
refugee definition, a person is a refugee if she is outside her country, and if she is
unable or unwilling to avail herself of the protection of her country because of a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion." This definition has been construed
B.

L.S., and Heilman, MJ., concurring). Thus, the BIA's holding that FGM is persecution is limited to FGM as it is
performed in Kasinga'stribe. See In re Kasinga, hL Dec. 3278, at 8, 11. The BIA did not decide whether less severe
forms of FGM will constitute persecution. As a result, new petitions for asylum based on FGM will need to be
evaluated to determine whether the particular form of FGM practiced is persecution. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
Similarly, the BIA refrained from deciding whether petitioners who have already had FGM would qualify for
asylum. The BIA's restraint is appropriate. BIA Members Filppu and Heilman explained that even though "this case
may well have implications beyond its facts" there is no "immediate need for a more comprehensive analytical
framework in which to address FGM claims. To the extent [such a framework] is needed... that comprehensive
guidance could more appropriately be issued through the legislative or regulatory process, not the [BIA]'s case
adjudication process." In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (Filppu, L.S., Heilman, M.J., concurring).
107. See Government's Brief in Response to Applicant's Appeal From Decision of Immigration Judge at 15,
In re Kasinga (No. A73-476-695).
108.

CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 98.

109. See id. at l-4.
110. See id. at2-3.
Ill. See id. at4.
112. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,427-28 (1987).
113. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
114. See id. The refugee definition adopted by the United States mirrors the definition used under international
law. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, art. 1(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152
(effective Apr. 22, 1954). Although the United States is not a party to the 1951 Convention, it is a party to the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which incorporates the 1951 Convention definition of refugee. See
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by the courts as having four elements: (1) well-founded fear; (2) of persecution; (3)
on account of one of the five protected categories (the "nexus" requirement); and (4)
government action or acquiescence (such that the petitioner is unwilling or unable to
avail herself of the state's protection).
1. Well-Founded Fear
To be a refugee, one must have a well-founded fear of persecution. Well-founded
fear "means that a person has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show
good reason why he fears persecution."'1 5 According to federal regulations, an
applicant "may qualify as a refugee either because he has suffered actual past
persecution or because he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.".6 Thus, if
the petitioner has already experienced persecution, she presumptively has a wellfounded fear of persecution. 117 A petitioner who has not yet been the victim of
persecution must prove that there is a reasonable possibility of future persecution."'
The well-founded fear standard has been interpreted to have both a subjective
component and an objective component." 9 Accordingly, the petitioner must actually
feel fearful, and, the fear must be objectively reasonable. A reasonable possibility of
persecution does not mean that the petitioner is more likely than not going to be the
victim of persecution.' 2° Rather, if the petitioner has a one-in-ten chance of
experiencing future persecution, then she faces a reasonable possibility of future
2
persecution. ' '

In two of the FGM asylum cases decided prior to In re Kasinga, 22 the petitioners
objected to FGM, were victims of forced FGM, and were threatened with death if
they revealed anything about those who performed the FGM.In In In re M.K., the U
held that "[r]espondent was previously persecuted by having female genital

Protocol Relating to the Status of the Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, (effective Oct. 4, 1967). As a result,
the United States isbound by the 1951 Convention definition of refugee. Moreover, Congress incorporated the 1951
Convention definition into domestic law in the 1980 Refugee Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
115. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 438 (citation omitted).
116. Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (1996).
117. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA
FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS para. 45 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]; Aliens and Nationality, 8

C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1996). This presumption can be overcome by proof of changed country conditions. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i). In such cases, the petitioner may still be granted asylum if she experienced "severe" past
persecution. See In re H., Int.
Dec. 3276, at 16-17 (BIA 1996). According to the BIA in H.:
the need to demonstrate compelling reasons for being unwilling to return resulting from the

severity of the past persecution suffered.., only arises if the presumption of a well-founded fear
of future persecution is successfully rebutted .... We reiterate that notwithstanding such
[changed] circumstances, for compelling reasons, an applicant may be afforded asylum even
where the evidence establishes such a change in conditions that he or she may be found to no

longer have a well-founded fear of persecution.
Id.
118. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25 (1984).
119. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 117, at para. 38.
120. See Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 438.
121. See id. at431.
122. Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 12, 1996).
123. See In re M. K., No. A72-374-558, at 7-8 (1 Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995); In re J., No. A72-370-565
(IJ
Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reported in More on IJDecision, supra note 86, at 1265.
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mutilation forcibly imposed on her."' 2 According to the Code of Federal
Regulations, this alone would satisfy the federal refugee definition." 2 Nevertheless,
the U went on to hold that the petitioner also had a well-founded fear of "future
persecution because of the threat made by the Bundo Society to kill those who reveal
their 'secret."" 26
In In re J., however, the U held that the petitioner did not have a well-founded fear
27
of persecution despite essentially identical circumstances.' According to the U,28 the
petitioner's previous experience of forced FGM did not amount to persecution. As
a result, J.' s fear was not presumptively well-founded, and she needed to prove that
29
there was a reasonable possibility of her future persecution. Neither J.'s fear of
retribution for having exposed the secrets of the Bundo Society during her asylum
her daughters, satisfied the U that
hearings," nor her fear of the likely mutilation of
3
'
existed.1
persecution
of
possibility
a reasonable
The basis for the U's conclusion in In re J. is unclear. However, it is possible that
the U used a narrow reading of well-founded fear that required the fear to be
personal, to be a fear of being persecuted oneself. If the U applied such a narrow
reading, then J.'s fear of her daughter's mutilation would not satisfy the well-founded
fear requirement. Although analysis by a prominent immigration reporting service,
in In
InterpreterReleases, did not reveal such a narrow reading on the part of the U
in another case. 132
circumstance
similar
a
in
fear
personal
required
U
another
J.,
re
In In re Oluloro, the U denied asylum to a Nigerian woman who had undergone
FGM herself, but who requested asylum based on her fear that her daughters would
33
be forcibly mutilated if they returned to Nigeria. The U construed the well-founded
fear requirement to mean fear for oneself, not for others." This interpretation of the

124. In re M. K., No. A72-374-558, at 12.
125. See Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(i)(i) (1996) ("The applicant may qualify as a refugee
either because he has suffered actual past persecution or because he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.").
126. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 12. The Bundo Society is a secret women's society in Sierra Leone that
performs the FGM ceremony and provides gender-role education to girls. See id. at 6.
127. See In re J., No. A72-370-565 (U Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reported in More on IJDecision, supra
note 86, at 1265.
128. See id.; see also Still More on Asylum Claims, supra note 86, at 1375.
129. See In re J., No. A72-370-565 (U Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reportedin More on IJ Decision, supra
note 86, at 1265 and in Still More on Asylum Claims, supra note 86, at 1375; see also Aliens and Nationality, 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1996).
130. A petitioner's views and testimony are "made public in the course of [asylum] proceedings (and] are not
concealed" from the relevant authorities. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 970 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J. dissenting).
Furthermore, if the testimony in an asylum proceeding "is not shielded from the government of the country to which
a person may be returned, it is only fair to take that testimony into account in determining whether a petitioner has
a basis for believing that the government will persecute her if she is returned." Id.
131. See In re I., No. A72-370-565 (U Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reported in Still More on Asylum
Claims, supra note 86, at 1375 n.2.
132. See In re Oluloro, No. A72-147-491 (U Portland, Or., Mar. 23, 1994), discussed in Patricia Dysart
Rudloff, In Re Oluloro: Risk of Female GenitalMutilation as "Extreme Hardship" in Immigration Proceedings,26
ST. MARY'S L. 877 (1995).
133. See In re Oluloro, No. A72-147-491, at 16-17.
134. Although the U in the Olulorocase denied asylum, he did grant suspension of deportation to the petitioner
because of the extreme hardship her daughters would face if they were forced to submit to FGM. See id. at 19. The
U in In re J., however, did not grant any form of relief to J. See In re J., No. A72-370-565, reported in Still More on
Asylum Claims, supra note 86, at 1376. This may be due to the U's conclusions that FGM is not persecution, and that
women who are victims of forced FGM are not members of a particular social group because they are capable of
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well-founded fear requirement is overly narrow and is incompatible with the
interpretation of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) that
"a woman can be considered as a refugee if she or her daughters/dependentsfear
being compelled to undergo FGM against their will; or, [if] she fears persecution for
to undergo or [refusing] to allow her daughters to undergo the
re [sic] refusing
135
practice.'
The decisions in M.K. and J. would not necessarily have been altered by the BIA's
decision in In re Kasinga,if Kasingahad been decided prior to M.K. and J. Although
the BIA held that FGM is persecution as it was performed by Kasinga's tribe, and
that Kasinga did have a well-founded fear of future persecution because she had not
yet experienced FGM, 136 the BIA did not address the question of the future
persecution of a petitioner's child. Thus, it remains unanswered whether protection
of one's children, rather than of one's self, from FGM will satisfy the well-founded
fear prong of the refugee definition.
Similarly, the BIA in Kasinga's case did not consider whether a woman who has
already been subjected to FGM has a well-founded fear of persecution. Thus, the
BIA's decision in Kasinga does not reconcile the divergent holdings in M.K. and J.
While, the outcome in M.K.'s case was consistent with extant asylum law, the
outcome of J.'s case was not. When the asylum petitioner has experienced past
persecution, as did M.K., she presumptively has a well-founded fear of persecution.
The U in J.'s case, however, erred by holding that J. did not have a well-founded fear
of persecution, even though she also had experienced FGM. There are two possible
explanations for this inconsistency. First, the U in J. may have mistakenly assumed
that because J. had already been "circumcised" she could not be circumcised again
(thereby making any fear of future persecution unreasonable). Yet, women can be
circumcised repeatedly. Indeed, re-circumcision is necessary in certain types of FGM
in order to have sex and to give birth. 137 And second, the U in J. may have incorrectly
believed that the United States would be deluged with women seeking asylum if it
were to grant asylum to women who already have been circumcised. 3
2. Persecution
Although persecution is not conclusively defined anywhere, "it may be inferred
that a threat to life orfreedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership of a particular social group is always persecution. Other
choosing to acquiesce in the abhorred practice. ("In this situation, respondent can not change the fact that she is a
female, but she can change her mind with regards to her position towards the FGM practices. It is not beyond the
respondent's control to acquiesce to the tribal position on FGM." Id.).
135. ALERT SERiEs, supra note 31, at 12-13 (emphases added).
136. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 2, 9-10, 11 (BIA June 12, 1996).
137. See TouBiA, supra note 3, at 10-11.
138. It is possible to infer from Canada's experience that the United States will not be subject to an onslaught
of gender-based asylum claims had the IJin In re J. ruled differently.
Canada promulgated gender guidelines similar to those of the INS in March 1993. In the two-year
period ending December 31, 1995, there were 40,000 refugee claims filed in Canada. Out of that
number, about two percent (1,130) were gender-related claims. Of the 1,130 gender-related claims
filed, 483 were granted.
Pamela Goldberg, U.S. Law and Women Asylum Seekers: Where Are They and Where Are They Going?, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 889, 896 (July 8, 1996).
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serious violations of human rights-for the same reasons-would also constitute
persecution.' 3 9 Within United States jurisprudence, persecution has been defined to
include torture,"4 confinement,' 4' and rape, 42 as well as "threat to the life or freedom
of, or the infliction
of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as
43
offensive.'
Prior to In re Kasinga,the question about whether FGM was persecution had not
been answered in a uniform manner by Us. The BIA finally addressed this question
and held that FGM "can constitute 'persecution' within the meaning of section
101(a)(42)(A)"' and that "[t]he type of persecution feared by [Kasinga] is very
severe.' 45 This holding of the BIA is, however, somewhat limited. The BIA did not
make a blanket ruling that all forms of FGM are persecution. Rather, the BIA
specifically limited its holding to FGM as it was practiced by Kasinga's tribe."4 The
type of FGM performed by Kasinga's tribe was infibulation, 147 the most severe form
of FGM. Thus, it remains to be seen whether lesser forms of FGM will be deemed
persecution.
The BIA's analysis in Kasinga may provide a model for analyzing whether less
severe forms of FGM will be deemed persecution. In earlier FGM-based cases, the
persecution analysis became mired in questions of the persecutor's intent, even
though intent is more accurately part of the "on account of" (or nexus) prong of the
refugee test. For example, the U in In re J. held that "[t]o constitute -persecution,
motive and purpose must be considered as well as consequence.' 41 Similarly, the U
in M.K. defined persecution as "harm or suffering inflicted upon persons to punish
them for possessing a belief or characteristic the persecutorseeks to overcome.' 49
These definitions imply that at least some attention should be paid to the
persecutor's intent to harm or motivation for punishing the victim. Yet, the U in M.K.
did not actually inquire into the persecutor's motives, but was concerned instead with
the extremity of the mistreatment. 5 Rather than discussing the persecutor's intent,
the U in M.K. focused on four categories of persecution: (1) extreme physical,
psychological, and verbal abuse; (2) serious violations of human rights; (3)
discriminatory treatment that leads to consequences of a substantially prejudicial
nature;' 5 ' and (4) a combination of harms that cumulatively amount to persecution.' 52

139. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 117, at para. 51 (emphasis added).

140. See Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
141. See id.
142. See Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434(9th Cir. 1987).
143. In re Acosta, 19 Immigration & Naturalization Dec. 211,222 (BIA March 1, 1985), available in Westlaw,

Allfeds database, 1985 WL 56042; see also Hemandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (persecution
is oppression inflicted on others because of a difference in views or status that the persecutor will not tolerate); Kovac
v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969).
144. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 8 (BIA June 12, 1996).
145. Id. at 10.
146. See id. at 8.
147. See id. at 4, 8; see also supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
148. In re J., No. A72-370-565, reportedin Still More on Asylum Claims, supra note 86, at 1376.
149. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 12 ( Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995) (citing In re Acosta, 19 Immigration
& Naturalization Dec. 211 (BIA March 1, 1985), available in WESTLAW, Allfeds database, 1985 WL 56042)
(emphasis added).
150. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 12-13.
151. Not all discrimination amounts to persecution. "Discrimination... can rise to the level of persecution
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According to the U, forced FGM, which resulted in physical and psychological harm,
was a violation of M.K.'s human rights and was discrimination.1 53 Thus, the U found
that M.K. experienced a combination of harms that together constituted past
persecution. In so doing, the U entirely avoided the question of intent.
With hindsight it is possible to see that the U in M.K. was correct in abandoning
the intent inquiry within the persecution prong. The BIA's persecution analysis in
Kasinga confirmed that "subjective 'punitive' or 'malignant' intent is not required
for harm to constitute persecution. ' 5
The Government's brief in Kasinga argued that a standard requiring malignant or
punitive intent is appropriate in most circumstances, but not in the case of FGM
because it is performed, not out of malice, but out of a desire to bind the individual
to the society and to create a sense of belonging in the community.155 The
Government argued that if malice were "always required before persecution is found,
then FGM would rarely be considered persecution.' 5 6 The Government then
articulated an exception to the general rule for practices which, by their very nature,
are so extreme as to be shocking. 57 According to the Government, FGM, in its most
severe form, "shocks the conscience because it amounts to an extreme bodily
invasion .... Female genital mutilation therefore can amount to persecution even if
the subjective intention of the one who would perform the circumcision is ostensibly
benign. 158
The BIA agreed that a malicious or punitive intent was not required.'5 9
Nevertheless, it did not adopt the Government's "shocks the conscience" formulation
because it found such a formulation unnecessary."W The BIA held that its
"characterization of FGM as persecution is consistent with our past definitions of that
term."161

The Government's argument in Kasinga for the creation of a new analytical
framework for FGM-based claims of persecution was a thinly veiled attempt to cast
gender-based claims outside of traditional asylum jurisprudence. As noted by
concurring BIA Members Filppu and Heilman, "the level of suffering associated with
FGM, as practiced by the applicant's tribe, would be more than enough to constitute
persecution if inflicted exclusively on a religious or political minority." 62 Thus, there
is no reason that infliction of the same level of suffering should not be considered
when a government imposes restrictions 'of a substantially prejudicial nature."' Arthur Helton, Criteria and
Procedures ForRefugee Protectionin the United States, 964 PRACICING LAw lNsT. 21, 24 (1996) (quoting UNHCR
HANDBOOK, supra note 117, at para. 54).
152. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 12.
153. See id.
154. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 8 (BIA June 12, 1996).
155. See Government's Brief in Response to Applicant's Appeal From Decision of Immigration Judge at 16,
In re Kasinga (No. A73-476-695).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 17.
158. Id. An ostensibly benign practice can be persecutory because of the applicant's subjective attitude toward
the harm. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 16, 18 (Rosenberg. L.D., concurring) (determining whether harm is
persecution "includes consideration of the applicant's attitude towards such treatment").
159. See id. at 10.
160. See id.
161. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 8 (BIA June 12, 1996).
162. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 12 (Filppu. L.S., and Heilman, M.J., concurring).
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persecution when it is inflicted exclusively on women and girls. Although one might
question whether persecution in the form of FGM is inflicted on account of political
opinion or "membership in a particular social group," the persecution prong of the
refugee test is distinct from the "on account of' element.' 63 Determinations of
whether FGM is persecution should not deviate from traditional persecution analysis
simply because the harm is gender-related.
3. The Nexus Requirement
In order to be eligible for asylum, the claimant also must prove that her
persecution is "on account of' race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion."6 The difficulty for women seeking asylum based
on persecution because of gender is obvious: there is no statutory ground for genderbased persecution. Nonetheless, women have attempted to meet the nexus requirement by using gender in conjunction with another statutory ground, such as political
opinion," membership in a particular social group,' and religion.'6 7 Indeed, political opinion and membership in a particular social group1 6' have been used successfully by petitioners seeking asylum based on FGM in the United States. These two
grounds will be explored in greater depth below.
a. Political Opinion
In addition to meeting all of the other statutory requirements for asylum, an
applicant seeking asylum based on political opinion, "must (1) specify the political
opinion on which he or she relies, [and] (2) show that he or she holds that
opinion." 69 The courts have construed "political opinion" somewhat broadly, so that
political opinion includes not only attitudes about one's government, but also
includes opinions
relating to the treatment and status of women generally within her country or
culture, or within her social, religious, or ethnic group. In addition, it includes
a woman's opposition to a particular law or mandated traditional custom that
restricts women's (but not men's) individual autonomy or movement; restricts

163. While the persecutor's intent is not relevant to whether the harm amounts to persecution, see In re
Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 8, the persecutor's intent is relevant to the "on account of' aspect of the refugee definition.
The "on account of" prong does not require the persecutor's intent to be malicious, although it must aim at
overcoming a characteristic of the petitioner. See id Although FGM can be seen as persecution on account of gender
because the persecutor is attempting to overcome the characteristic of having intact genitalia, this does not
immediately satisfy the asylum statute because gender is not one of the five protected categories. See 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101 (a)(42)(A) (1994).
164. See id.
165. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993); In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893 (U Arlington, Va., Dec.
20, 1994); In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 19-21.

166. See Fatin, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993); In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, at 17-19; In re M.K., No. A72374-558, at 17-19.
167. See Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en banc, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996). Because
FGM is not a religious practice, this Comment does not discuss religion as an avenue for asylum based on FGM.
168. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 14 (political opinion; membership in a particular social group); In
re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 9 (membership in a particular social group).
169. Fatin, 12F.3d at 1242.
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women's (but not men's) legal rights or access to education, employment, health
care, etc.; or imposes affirmative requirements not imposed on men. 7 °
Consistent with these requirements, the U in In re M.K. found that forced FGM
can amount to persecution on account of political opinion when a petitioner resists
and complains about FGM, as did M.K."' Central to the U's holding, however, was
72
that the FGM be forced, and that the petitioner have actively resisted the practice.
Nonetheless, the U noted that persecution based on political opinion exists when the
persecutor perceives the petitioner to hold antagonistic opinions because she refuses
to conform to cultural norms and roles, even though she does not protest those
practices, norms, and roles.'7 With this statement, the U appeared to say that those
who inflict FGM may impute antagonistic views to women who merely evade the
cultural practice.
The U's finding in M.K., however, seems to contradict the United States Supreme
Court's requirement in INS v. Elias-Zacarias174 that the persecution in question be
on account of the petitioner's actual beliefs, not what the persecutor perceives the
petitioner's beliefs to be.' 7 According to the Supreme Court, "[tihe ordinary meaning
of the phrase 'persecution on account of... political opinion' ... is persecution on
account of the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor' S.''t76 The Court then
provide evidence that the persecution was because of his
required that the petitioner
77
political opinion.
The Elias-Zacariasholding makes an asylum claim based on political opinion
very difficult for women fleeing FGM. Even if the persecutor is motivated by a
perceived clash in political opinions (because the victim's evasion of FGM flouts
cultural norms), a court, applying the Elias-Zacariasstandard, is unlikely to find the
nexus requirement satisfied. Under Elias-Zacarias,the required nexus only exists
when the victim's actual political opinion is accurately understood by the
persecutor. 78 Thus, in cases in which the woman avoiding FGM has not articulated
her opposition to the practice in political terms (for example, by saying that it is an
exercise in controlling women's sexuality), courts could presume that reasons other
than political opinion motivate the woman's avoidance of FGM. Of course, cases in
which the woman seeking to avoid FGM actually articulates her political opposition
to FGM in a public way will be rare. Most women in such circumstances will not
want to call attention to their actual political beliefs, out of fear of forced FGM and
of the social consequences of avoiding FGM, such as ostracization, economic
hardship, etc.'17 Because a court could presume alternative reasons for the victim's
opposition, such as health reasons, Elias-Zacariasmay effectively limit women (and

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 19.
See id. at 14, 17.
See id. at 14, 20.
See id.at 20.
502 U.S. 478 (1992).
Compare In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at20, with Elias-Zacarias,502 U.S. at 482.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
See id.
See id.
See discussion supra Part I; supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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girls) fleeing FGM to claiming asylum based on membership in a particular social
group.
b. Membership in a Particular Social Group
Membership in a particular social group provides another avenue for gender-based
asylum claims, and has been used both successfully8 0 and unsuccessfully' in relation to FGM-based petitions. This inconsistency in outcomes parallels the various
definitions of particular social group used in different federal circuits, 18 2 and reflects
the ambiguity surrounding the intended purpose of this prong.
In this Subsection, I will address the history and development of the "membership
in a particular social group" category, the competing definitions of the category
utilized by various federal circuit courts, and the ways in which the membership in
a particular social group category has been used by asylum petitioners to bring
gender-related claims. After these three background discussions, I will address how
the membership in a particular social group category has been used in the context of
FGM.
i. Historical Background
The competing definitions arise in part from a basic confusion regarding the
reason why "membership of a particular social group" was included in the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees18 3 (1951 Convention). As the 1951
Convention was originally drafted, membership in a particular social group was not
an included category. This category was added later, by amendment without debate
and nearly without discussion, during the drafting conference. 184 Indeed, the entire

180. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 11 (BIA June 12, 1996); In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 14 (IJ
Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995).
181. See In re J., No. A72-370-565 (IJ Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reported in Still More on Asylum
Claims, supranote 86, at 1375.
182. For examples from different federal circuits, see discussion infra Part IV. The inconsistency among circuit
courts is troubling because it means that the outcome of a given asylum claim may depend on where the claim was
filed, rather than on the merits of the claim itself. Appropriate deference to the BIA would obviate such inconsistency
because:
The BIA is the front-line body whose function is to determine the facts and interpret
[immigration] law .... If the [BIA] is doing its job... lower-level agency actors and practicing
lawyers must look first to it as the law-enunciating body, not to the federal courts .... The
principle of deference to the BIA... was the message ... of the Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias
New Asylum Jurisprudence,supra note 66, at 1179. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he BIA's determination...
must be upheld if 'supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."'
INS v. Elias-Zacarias,502 U.S. 478,481 (1992) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1994)). The Court added that "[t]o
reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it." Id. at 481
n.1. Under this model of deference to the BIA,
[tihe function of the federal courts ... is to conect the [BIA] when it either avoids its job, or when
its interpretation is unreasonable or incorrect in light of the statute and [c]ongressional intent. If
the [BIA] plays its role in an authentic manner, however, the relevance of court decisions-and
particularly those inconsistent with those of the Board-is greatly diminished.
New Asylum Jurisprudence,supra note 66, at 1179.
183. July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (effective Apr. 22, 1954).
184. See Michel logna Prat, The Notion of "Membership of a ParticularSocial Group": A European
Perspective, in ASYLUM LAW & PRACTICE INEUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 71, 72-73 (Jacqueline Bhabha &
Geoffrey Coil eds., 1992).
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discussion of the amendment amounted to its introduction by the Swedish delegate
to the Conference of Plenipotentiares, which finalized the content of the Convention:
"[E]xperience has shown that certain refugees were persecuted because they
belonged to particular social groups. The draft [1951] Convention does not provide
any special provision for '[sic] such cases, and it would be advisable to adopt such
a provision."' 5 Due to the paucity of discussion on this issue, little is to be learned
from the "legislative history" of the 1951 Convention regarding the purpose or
meaning of the membership in a particular social group category.
In 1980, the United States Congress passed the Refugee Act,'86 which incorporates
the 1951 Convention definition of refugee into domestic law. Because Congress was
merely attempting "to bring the United States into compliance with obligations it had
undertaken in ratifying the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees [(1967
Protocol)],' ' 7 Congress engaged in little or no discussion of the particular terms or
provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act when it was passed. 8 Rather than considering
the Refugee Act's specific refugee definition, Congress emphasized that the Refugee
Act's definition of refugee "[was] based directly upon the language of the [1967]
Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent with the [1967]
Protocol.' 81 9 As a result, there is little domestic legislative history defining
"membership in a particular social group." Nonetheless, Congress's emphasis on
consistency with the internationally accepted definition should help inform our
domestic interpretation of the concept. According to one scholar,
[b]y 1980, almost thirty years had passed since the original inclusion of the
social group term. In that time commentators had begun to sketch in the contours
of the social group concept .... Accordingly, although the United States
Congress may not have articulated the meaning it intended for social groupbased persecution, a substantial body of academic, administrative, and judicial
interpretations of this term had developed, and Congress gave no indication that
it intended to reject those developments."
In virtually all court cases since its inclusion in the definition of refugee, the
phrase "particular social group" has been flexibly interpreted. 9 ' Its definition should
be developed progressively in order to provide protection that "correspond[s] to the
overflowing imagination of the oppressive powers."'" Accordingly, the membership

185. Id. at 72 (quoting Traveaux Preparatoires,UN docs. A/CONF.2/ SR. 3 p. 14).
186. Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1151-53, 1157-59,
1181-82, 1253-55, 1521-25 (1994), and 22 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994)).
187. Karen Musalo, IrreconcilableDiferences? Divorcing Refugee Protectionsfrom Human Rights Norms,
15 MICH. J. INr'L L. 1179, 1183 (1994) (footnote omitted) (discussing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37
(1987)).
188. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-781, 19-20 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 161.
189. Id. According to the Supreme Court, "[i]f one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new
definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the entire [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress'[s] primary purposes was to
bring United States refugee law into conformance with the [1967 Protocol] .... Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 436;
see also S. REP. No. 96-256, at 4, 14-15 (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144, 154-55.
190. Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on PersecutionDue to Membership
in a ParticularSocial Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 514 (1993) (citations omitted).
191. For a discussion of cases interpreting the "particular social group" requirement, see id.
192. Prat, supranote 184, at 79; cf GOODWiN-GEL, supranote 64, at 47 (arguing that in principle there is no
reason that the membership in a particular social group ground should not be progressively developed); ATr.E
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in a particular social group category is broad enough to accommodate women fleeing
persecution based on FGM, even though this particular social group was not
identified at the time of passage of either the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol,
or the federal 1980 Refugee Act.
Flexibility and liberality are not the only concerns of those interpreting and
applying the Refugee Act. Rather, the multiple definitions of particular social group
reflect an attempt to balance two competing concerns:
(1)
that the particular social group category be given a liberal reading which is
broad enough to offer protection to groups whose social origins put them at risk
and flexible enough to evolve in response to changing circumstances; and (2)
that the definition not be so broad as to encompass all persons who may be
facing harm as a result of war or generalized violence, or persons who can
escape persecution by reasonably acceptable alterations of their behavior.'93
ii. Competing Definitions of Membership in a Particular Social Group
Each of the five definitions of particular social group discussed below strikes the
balance differently between flexibility and the need to limit the size of the social
group. The first three definitions used to determine whether a particular social group
exists are open-ended, tend to be less concerned with the size of the particular social
group, and focus on the fundamental nature of the characteristic that links group
members. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's definition attempts to limit the size of any
given particular social group by requiring a certain uniformity of experience and
consciousness among group members."9 Finally, the Second Circuit has developed
a hybrid test that incorporates both the immutable characteristic and identifiability
requirements used in the other tests, but without requiring a shared consciousness
element or group identity. 95
The first definition is that of the UNHCR Handbook. The UNHCR Handbook
defines "particular social group" as a group with a "similar background, [similar]

GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ININTERNATIONAL LAw 219-20 (1966) (describing membership in a

particular social group as a broad category meant to be a gap-filler). T. David Parish also argues that:
There is... no way of establishing whether the drafters of the [1951] Convention intended to
protect any then identifiable group of refugees under this language, as opposed to providing for
future contingencies or for groups that had been overlooked. The vagueness of the term 'social
group' counsels against an historical interpretation[-]if any particular group had been intended,
that group could simply have been named (at least by way of illustration) rather than leaving its
protection to the uncertainties of future interpretation.
T. David Parrish, Membership in a ParticularSocial Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the
Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REv.923, 927 n.21 (1992). But see JAMES C. HATHAWAY, LAW OF
REFUGEE STATUS 159 (1991) (The membership in a particular social group category was intended to protect refugee
"from known forms of harm.").
193. Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution:Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 625, 652 (1993). Although it may be appropriate to deny asylum to those petitioners who can avoid persecution
"by reasonably acceptable alterations of their own behavior," requiring a woman opposed to FGM to acquiesce in the
practice is not an example of a reasonably acceptable alteration. Yet, the IJin In re J. based his denial of asylum in
the belief that the petitioner could acquiesce in the tribal practice of FGM (and somehow thereby nullify its
persecutory character), even though she could not alter the fact of being female. See In re J.,
No. A72-370-565 (U
Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reportedin Still More Asylum Claims, supranote 86, at 1375 (Oct. 6,1995).
194. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
195. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
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habits, or [similar] social status."' 1 This definition is the most broad. It supports the

argument that particular social group classifications were meant to be flexible and
inclusive.'9

The second definition was developed by the BIA. The BIA, in In re Acosta,
created a slightly more restrictive definition than the above first definition, when it
held that a particular social group is
a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex . ..or in some

circumstances it might be a shared past experience ....
Whatever the common
characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members of the
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. 98
The BIA's definition in Acosta focuses on immutable characteristics, thereby
opening the door to claims based on FGM because of its explicit recognition of sex
as a group characteristic. In addition, the BIA's definition recognizes that alteration
of some characteristics or beliefs would be abhorrent to the individual required to
undergo such a change. Under this definition, women who consider the "alteration"
of intact genitalia and sexual organs by FGM abhorrent would comprise a particular
social group for whom FGM would be persecution. In fact, the BIA, relying on the
Acosta definition, later held in Kasinga that "[t]he characteristic of having intact
genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman
that she should not be required to change it." 19
In the third definition, the First Circuit effectively combined the UNHCR
Handbook and Acosta definitions. In Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, the First Circuit
found that the petitioner, a Ghanian woman "associated with the former
government," a member of the Ashanti tribe, and among a class of professional,
educated, business-people, was a member of a particular social group for asylum
purposes." According to the First Circuit, these characteristics were "essentially
beyond the petitioner's power to change." 201 Under any of the above three definitions,
women seeking asylum, like M.K., Kasinga, and J., should be entitled to asylum as
a member of a particular social group, either because FGM is so contrary to their
beliefs that it would be abhorrent to them to undergo the ritual, or because having
intact genitalia is fundamental to a woman's identity.
If the courts interpret membership in a particular social group broadly under any
of the above three approaches, FGM-based claims are likely to be successful. In
contrast, these claims will be more difficult in courts that follow a fourth approach
similar to that imposed by the Ninth Circuit.202 In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, the Ninth
Circuit created a four-part test to determine whether a particular social group

196. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 117, para. 77.
197. See Kelly, supra note 193, at 648 (discussing Traveaux Preparatoires,
supra note 185).
198. In re Acosta, 19 Immigration. & Naturalization Dec. 211,233 (BIA March 1, 1985), availablein Westlaw,
Allfeds database, 1985 WL 56042.

199.
200.
201.
202.

In re Kasinga, Int.
Dec. 3278, at 9 (BIA June 12, 1996).
See Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 623, 626 (1st Cir. 1985).
Id. at 626.
See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
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exists. 20 3 The test requires: (1) a close affiliation among the group members; (2) a
common interest upon which the affiliation is based; (3) voluntary association; and
(4) a common trait that distinguishes the group members from the general
population.' The four prongs of this test attempt to distinguish cohesive,
homogenous groups' deserving of legal protection, from other groupings that might
be recognizable, but which do not deserve such protection because they are merely
statistical groupings,' or because they are "defined principally in relation to the
harm feared by the asylum applicant."'
In Sanchez-Trujillo, the Ninth Circuit was concerned with the possibility of
granting asylum to "'sweeping demographic divisions' that encompass a plethora of
different lifestyles, vprying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings"
all within one social group.' °s But, this overly-acute concern with not opening the
floodgates to unknown numbers of refugees denies protection to deserving
individuals. "[T]here is no rational basis for denying protection to individuals who,
even if divided in lifestyle, culture, interests, and politics, may yet be linked across
another dimension of affinity. ' 9
Women and girls fleeing FGM present just such a social group. They may come
from any socio-economic status, political party, or lifestyle, and they are unlikely to
have any kind of close affiliation, or any voluntary association. In most
circumstances, these women and girls are ostracized.210 For this reason alone, women
and girls who refuse FGM are unlikely to publicly identify each other or maintain a
voluntary association, even if they have a common interest in avoiding FGM for
themselves (or in eradicating FGM for all females). As a result, such women and girls
would likely be denied asylum in the Ninth Circuit, even though they are linked by
their refusal to undergo FGM, and even though this particular characteristic is the
reason for their persecution.
On the other hand, in societies that practice FGM, it is common knowledge who
has undergone the ritual and who has not, despite a lack of voluntary association and
close affiliation. Thus, an underlying goal of the Ninth Circuit's test-identifiability
of group members-is satisfied even without a close affiliation or a voluntary
association by the women or girls in question. Thus, the Ninth Circuit could
effectively shrink its test to two prongs (requiring proof of a common interest and a
common trait) without risking an enlargement of the particular social group. Other

203. See id. at 1576.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 1577.
206. See id. at 1576 ("[A] statistical group of males taller than six feet would not constitute a 'particular social
group' under any reasonable construction of the statutory term, even if individuals with such characteristics could be
shown to be at greater risk of persecution than the general population.").
207. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 15 (Filppu, L.S., Heilman, M.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
208. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 64, at 359 (discussing Sanchez-Trujillo).
209. Id. at 365.
210. "A woman who has not undergone genital mutilation may be considered a social outcast or as someone
who has 'destroyed the family honor' and deserves to be killed." ALERT SERIES, supra note 31, at 3. "African women
who oppose female genital mutilation, or try to protect their female children, are frequently denounced by family,
friends, and society as '[w]estem' feminists and may face threats to their freedom, threats or acts of physical violence
and social ostracization." Id. at 14.
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elements of the refugee definition will prevent overuse and abuse of asylum. Guy
Goodwin-Gill rightly argues that:
If a sociological approach is adopted to the notion of groups in society, then
apparently unconnected and unallied individuals may indeed satisfy the criteria:
mothers; mothers and families with two children; women at risk of domestic
violence; capitalists; former capitalists; homosexuals; and so forth. Whether they
then qualify as refugees having a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of
their membership in a particular social group will depend on answers to related
questions, including the perceptions of the group shared by other groups or
State authorities,policies and practicesvis-a-vis the group, and the risk, ifany,
of treatmentamounting to persecution.2 '

Finally, in the fifth definition of particular social group, the Second Circuit in
Gomez v. INS employed a "compromise" definition that seems to embody the
sociological notion of a group that Goodwin-Gill describes." 2 The Second Circuit
test requires members of a particular social group to "possess some fundamental
characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a
persecutor-or in the eyes of the outside world in general. 2 3 Women seeking
asylum in order to escape persecution based on FGM could satisfy the Second
Circuit's definition-women and girls in this group share the immutable
characteristic of sex and are identifiable by the persecutor because of their failure to
comply with cultural norms and rituals. This definition utilizes a hybrid
internal/external approach that combines the immutable or fundamental characteristic
requirement of the BIA's Acosta test with the group-identification requirements of
the Ninth Circuit. If the Second Circuit's approach in Gomez were applied to FGM
cases, then women who refuse to undergo FGM could be deemed internally linked
by having engaged in a particular activity (refusal to undergo FGM), and could be
externally defined by the perceptions of those in their community (as failing to satisfy
the culturally-defined requirements of womanhood).2 4
iii. Membership in a Particular Social Group and Gender-Based Claims
The perceived tension between applying the social group category flexibly enough
to protect deserving individuals while not extending the category so far as to render
the refugee definition meaningless is particularly prevalent in gender-based claims
because of the potential size of such a social group.21 5 One way that courts have
limited the number of potential refugees in a social group category is to require that

211. GOODwIN-GILL, supra note 64, at 366 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
212. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
213. Id. at 664.
214. Guy Goodwin-Gill uses this analysis to demonstrate why the former capitalists from eastern Europe
constitute members of a particular social group even though they never were "formally associated one with another.
...What counted... was the fact that they were not only internally linked by having engaged in a particular type
of (past) economic activity, but also externally defined, partly if not exclusively, by the perceptions of the new ruling
class." GoODWIN-GiLL, supra note 64, at 361.
215. Itis important to note, however, that female petitioners bringing a membership in a particular social group
claim must still satisfy all of the other statutory requirements before being granted asylum. The other requirements
will prevent over-extension of the refugee category to those who should not qualify" even though they belong to a
broad, particular social group.
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21 6
the social group exist in society for reasons other than the persecution itself. That
is to say, women must exist as a social group for reasons other than their relation to
FGM. Yet, this requirement fails to recognize that the status and treatment of women
in patriarchal society create women as a social group independent of FGM.
Patriarchal society, by its very nature, regulates male and female behavior and roles
such that women comprise a meaningful social group ipsofacto. Women not only
share immutable characteristics, but they also share similar experiences with others
in their group, stemming from the treatment the group receives from society at
large.217 Society's treatment of women informs the consciousness of the persecutor,
dictating that the persecutor treat women as a group differently than men, in various
ways not limited to the infliction of FGM. Thus, it is misleading to suggest that
women do not form a social group except in relation to a particular form of
persecution. Women exist as a group apart from any one type of persecution purely
by virtue of their socially-constructed gender identity.
At least two federal circuits recognize that gender can define a particular social
group.2" 8 The Third Circuit accepted gender as the basis for a particular social group
in Fatin v. INS.219 "[T]o the extent that the petitioner ... suggests that she would be
persecuted or has a well-founded fear that she would be persecuted in Iran simply
by the federal
because she is a woman, she has satisfied the first" element required
2 °
asylum statute, identification of a particular social group. " The Eighth Circuit
adopted the Fatin approach in 1994: "We agree... that a group of women, who
refuse to conform and whose opposition is so profound that they would choose to
suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance, may well satisfy the [refugee]
definition."22
Even though gender can help define a particular social group, courts that recognize
gender delimit the particular social group by incorporating additional characteristics
into the description. In Fatin, for example, the particular social group was delimited
to include only "those Iranian women who find [Iran's gender-specific] laws so
abhorrent that they 'refuse to conform', even though... 'the routine penalty' for
is '74 lashes, a year's imprisonment, and in many cases brutal rapes
noncompliance
222
and death."
The refusal to conform element often takes the form of requiring that the particular
social group members oppose the persecutory practice. For example, the Eighth
Circuit Court in Safaie held that Safaie was not a member of the particular social
group of women who refuse to conform to social norms because "she did not assert

216. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 14 (BIA June 12, 1996) (Filppu, L.S., Heilman, M.J.,
concurring) ("[W]e simply do not know... whether the similar social groups proposed by the parties are recognized
as groupings for any other purposes within Togolese society aside from the serious personal harm at issue here.").
These concurring BIA Members would have remanded the case for further examination because "it is questionable
whether the statute was meant to encompass groups that are defined principally in relation to the harm feared by the
asylum applicant." Id. at 15 n.3.
217. See Arthur C. Helton, Persecutionon Account of Membership in a Social GroupAs a Basisfor Refugee
Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 39, 51, 52 (1983).
218. See Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994); Fatinv. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3rd Cir. 1993).
219. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
220. Id.
221. Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
222. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 14).
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'some missionary fever' to defy the law... [and because] her opposition was not of
the depth and intensity required."' But, the dual requirements of Fatinand Safaie
(willingness to suffer the severe consequences of non-conformity, and missionary
fever in one's opposition or non-conformance) are particularly harsh and are
inconsistent with other asylum law.
The fallacy in the Fatinand Safaie decisions is that an individual must show that
she would "choose to suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance" in order
to establish the depth of her conviction. Nowhere else in asylum law has an
applicant been required to meet such a high standard .... In... the political
opinion category.... courts have not held that an individual must show that he
or she would continue to express his or her beliefs regardless of the consequences. It is enough that the individual establish the holding of such beliefs, and
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of those beliefs.224
The FGM cases based upon membership in a particular social group may suffer the
same maladies afflicting Fatin and Safaie, namely, confusion regarding the
requirements of refusal to conform and opposition to the practice.
iv. The FGM Cases: A Sub-Category of Gender-Based Social Group Claims
In re M.K.m and In re Kasinga2 address social group in the context of FGM. In
both cases, opposition to FGM was a defining characteristic of the particular social
group. 227 According to the U in M.K., M.K. was a member of "the sub-group of
Sierra Leone women who are forced to undergo female genital mutilation" because
of their opposition to the practice.' Similarly, the BIA held that Kasinga belonged
to a social group comprised of "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who
have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice."2 9 In this
way, the M.K. and Kasingadecisions do not deviate from the gender-based, social
group holdings in Fatin and Safaie.
Thus a significant question remaining for future cases is whether opposition to
FGM means simple avoidance of the ritual, some more elaborate refutation of the
practice (such as more traditional political protest), or willingness "to suffer the
severe consequences of noncompliance... ."230 By holding that its construction of
a relevant social group was consistent with both the BIA's Acosta and the Third
Circuit's Fatin standards, 1 the BIA in Kasingafailed to explain what "opposition
to the practice" really entails.

223. Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
224. Goldberg, supra note 138, at 894.
225. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995).
226. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 12, 1996).
227. See id. at 18 (Rosenberg, L.D., concurring); In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 18.
228. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 18.
229. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 8 (emphasis added).
230. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993); see Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636,640 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[A]
group of women, who refuse to conform and whose opposition is so profound that they would choose to suffer the
severe consequences of noncompliance, may well satisfy the definition" of membership in a particular social group.).
231. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 8.
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On the one hand, the BIA's Acosta standard 2 implicitly requires opposition to a
practice, for if a characteristic is so fundamental to a petitioner that it should not be
changed, then the petitioner is, by definition, opposed to that change. To the extent
that the Acosta standard inherently requires opposition to the practice, then the Third
233
Circuit's Fatin requirement of an explicit opposition (by refusing to conform) is
not only redundant, but unnecessarily raises the burden on the petitioner. Perhaps
even more significantly, the Fatin requirement of explicit opposition to a practice
blurs the boundary between political opinion and membership in a particular social
group claims. Even though
[t]he boundary between the notions of social group and of political opinions is
not rigid, and there is overlap between the two criteria ....

[Tihe notion of

social group [should be] called upon when the expression of political opinions
by the person in question is accidental, not usual, and does not indicate the
existence of an active political stance .... 2. "

Thus, the conflation is problematic because it imports into the membership in a
particular social group category the burdensome and troubling requirements of the
Supreme Court's Elias-Zacariasv. INS 5 test discussed above in Part IV.B.3.a, when
the particular social group membership and political opinion categories are really
alternative grounds for a grant of asylum. As separate grounds, the petitioner's
opposition, or lack of explicit opposition, to the practice of FGM should not be
dispositive of her social group claim.
The concurring opinions in the Kasinga case reveal a nascent understanding that
requiring opposition to the practice as an element of the social group definition
unnecessarily and inappropriately conflates political opinion and social group
claims. 6 Concurring BIA Member Rosenberg's opinion in Kasinga explained that
it is unnecessary to include the petitioner's opposition to the practice of female
genital mutilation in the definition of the particular social group because social group
claims are status-based:
Unlike requests for asylum premised upon political opinion, social group claims
... are status based and do not necessarily require a showing of the presence of
an individual's opinions or activities which spurs the persecutor's wrath or
otherwise motivates the harm or persecution. Rather, such requests involve a

232. See In re Acosta, 19 Immigration & Naturalization Dec. 211 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985), available in Westlaw,
Allfeds database, 1985 WL 56042.
233. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 9. It is unclear whether the BIA would have invoked Fatin had the
Kasinga case also not arisen in the Third Circuit. (This is because the BIA applies the law of the circuit in which the
asylum case was filed.) For a discussion of the problems arising from the BIA's application of decisions from
different circuits, see supra note 182.
234. Prat, supra note 184, at 77.
235. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
236. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 12, 17, 18 (Filppu, L.S., Heilman, MJ., and Rosenberg, L.D.,
concurring). Significantly, two other concurring BIA Members stated that "it is not essential to choose" whether or
not "the 'social group' definition includes an element of personal opposition by the victim .... [Tihe applicant would
qualify for relief under either proffered social group." Id. at 12 (Filppu. L.S., Heilman, M.J., concurring). Perhaps
this indicates that the BIA is moving away from including an "opposition to" element of the social group definition.
See id.
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determination of whether the shared characteristics are those which motivate the
agent of persecution to overcome or otherwise harm the individual."
Despite recognition by threes BIA members that personal opposition to the
practice of FGM is unnecessary to find membership in a particular social group, the
majority opinion in Kasinga did include an element of personal opposition in its
description of the social group of which Kasinga was a member. 39 By embracing
both the Acosta and Fatinstandards, the BIA in Kasinga left intact the conflation of
political opinion and membership in a particular social group appropriately criticized
by BIA Member Rosenberg.
The confusion over whether opposition to the persecutory practice should be
included in the definition of a particular social group is just one demonstration of the
fact that, while the social group category may be the most promising for women
seeking refuge from FGM, it unfortunately remains a murky and shifting concept.
The precise contours of the social group category differ among the BIA and each
federal circuit. As a result, various levels of affiliation, association, commonconsciousness, opposition to the persecution, and identifiability of group members
by the persecutor may be required. Because there is no definitive, controlling test for
membership in a particular social group, these claims may be difficult to make
successfully. However, future FGM-based claims will provide opportunities for
Asylum Officers, Us, and the BIA to clarify the existing ambiguity.
4. Government Action or Acquiescence
The UNHCR Handbook recognizes that persecution does not always occur at the
hands of the government.' Indeed, the persecution may often come
from sections of the population that do not respect the standards established by
the laws of the country concerned .... Where serious discriminatory or other
offensive acts are committed by the local populace, they can be considered as
persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities
or if the authorities
24
refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection. 1
The BIA has construed the federal asylum statute consistently with the UNHCR's
recommended interpretation, such that persecution by non-governmental actors will
satisfy the statute if the government in question acquiesced in the persecution by
failing to protect the victims (either
because it chose not to act or because it was
42
unable to control the persecutors).

237. See id. at 17-18 (Rosenberg, L.D., concurring) (citations omitted).
238. In addition to Member Rosenberg, two other BIA Members stated that "it is not essential to choose"
whether or not "the 'social group' definition includes an element of personal opposition by the victim ... [The
applicant would qualify for relief under either proffered social group." Id. at 12 (Filppu, L.S., Heilman, MJ.,
concurring).
239. See id. at 18.
240. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 117, para. 65.
241. Id.
242. See In re McMullen, 19 Immigration and Naturalization Dec. 90 (BIA 1975); In re Pierre, 15 Immigration
and Naturalization Dec. 461 (BIA 1975). According to the UNHCR Division of International Protection, FGM "can
be regarded as persecution. The toleration of these acts by the authorities, or the unwillingness of the authorities to
provide protection against them, amounts to official acquiescence." ALERT SERIES, supranote 31, at 12.
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Some countries in which FGM is practiced have taken steps to eradicate the
practice, including outlawing all forms of FGM. However, in most cases the practice
continues, unregulated and undeterred.4 3 In In re M.K., for example, the U
recognized that the police would not protect the petitioner from forced FGM; a
woman who has experienced forced FGM has no legal recourse because Sierra Leone
has not outlawed FGM and because "it is part of traditional custom. Complaints to
the police would be useless and potentially harmful, because the police would merely
advise the Bundo Society that she had divulged the 'secret.' [A woman's d]ivulging
the secret would result in her being harassed, threatened, physically harmed, and
possibly killed." 244 In M.K.'s particular case, M.K. had avoided being mutilated for
nearly ten years, but was abducted and had FGM forcibly inflicted upon her.4 5 The
U found that, although the government did not commit the persecutory act itself (that
is, the government did not perform the FGM), the government was more than merely
unwilling or unable to protect the petitioner. 46 Rather, the U found that the Sierra
Leone government actually may have "facilitate[d FGM] by advising the Bundo
Society of women who complain." 247 Because the Sierra Leone government
acquiesced in the persecution, the M.K. court found that the petitioner was unable to
avail herself of State assistance. 248
In the strikingly similar case of In re J., the U found that the government action
prong of the asylum test was not satisfied." Although the U recognized that the
persecutor need not be the government, but could be a group that the government
could not control, the U failed to recognize that the petitioner's tribe could be a
persecutor outside the control of the government. What seemed to underlie the U's
opinion in J. was an assumption, not that the government could not control the
petitioner's tribe, but that it should not control the tribe because FGM is a cultural
practice not viewed as abhorrent or barbaric by those who practice it --even
though, in this case, the FGM was imposed forcibly, after the petitioner had been
abducted, gagged, and bound."' Thus, despite the petitioner's personal objection to
FGM, the fact that the FGM was forced upon her, and the fact that FGM is

The BIA's holdings in McMullen and Pierre are consistent with international law. The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights held in the Velasquez Rodriquez case that "[a]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is
initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person...) can lead to
international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required." Velasquez Rodriquez, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
July 29, 1988, at 154.
243. Although Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, and the Sudan have outlawed FGM, see James, supranote
68, at 206, the illegalization of the practice has not eradicated it. FGM is still prevalent in Egypt and the Sudan.
Moreover, these laws may prohibit the most extreme form of FGM (infibulation), but may still allow excision and
or citoridectomy. See Karen Hughes, Note, The Criminalizationof Female GenitalMutilation in the United States,
4. J.L. & POL'Y 321 (1995).
244. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558, at 8 (IJArlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995).
245. See id.
246. See id. at 13.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. In re J., No. A72-370-565 (IJBaltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reportedin Still More on Asylum Claims,
supra note 86, at 1376.
250. See id.
251. See In re J., No. A72-370-565, reported in More on IJ Decision, supra note 86, at 1265.
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irreversible, the U in J.found
2 that FGM was a tribal matter, essentially
purview of the government.
The U's determination in In re J. is especially problematic in light of the
Considerationsfor Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claimsfor Women issued
by the United States Department of Justice on May 26, 1995. Although these
Considerationswere issued a month after the decision in In re J., and although they
are not binding authority, the BIA should take them into account if this case is
appealed. Under the Considerations,"[t]he relevant issue is whether the woman
applying for asylum was subjected to or reasonably feared being subjected to the
violence with no recourse to state protection. This lack of recourse to state protection
may be because the state is unable or unwilling to provide such protection." 2 3 The
U's decision in J. is troubling because it affirms the federal government's
unwillingness to protect petitioners based on an U's perception that the foreign
government's rationale for doing so is reasonable. The J. decision hopefully will be
overruled or qualified in future applications of the federal asylum statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Each element of the federal asylum statute has potential pitfalls for a petitioner
seeking asylum from FGM. First, federal case law has yet to decide whether the
general presumption that a victim of past persecution has a well-founded fear of
future persecution will apply to women who have already been circumcised. Second,
the BIA's holding in Kasinga that infibulation is persecution leaves unanswered
whether less invasive forms of FGM also are persecution. Third, as in all asylum
claims, the nexus (or "on account of") element is especially difficult to prove.
Because Us, BIA Members, and circuit court judges have blurred the line between
the political opinion and membership in a particular social group categories when
gender is an issue, it is unclear when the intent and motivation of the persecutor come
into play. However, at the very least, the BIA's decision in Kasinga tells us that a
malicious intent on the part of the persecutor is not required. This is significant for
women bringing FGM-based claims because the motivation of the person imposing
FGM is usually benign, and, in fact, may be based on love. Unfortunately, standards
for proving that the persecution is on account of membership in a particular social
group are inconsistent among the federal circuits, and are especially stringent with
regard to gender-based claims. While a petitioner's status as a woman with intact
genitalia should be enough to qualify the petitioner as a member of a particular social
group, some circuits require more. In some cases, a petitioner must not only fail to
conform to the contested practice, but must also actively oppose the practice. Active
opposition to the practice may further require women to suffer the consequences of
failing to comply before they are offered protection. Taken to its logical extreme, the
social group category would require martyrdom of women fleeing FGM, because the
consequence of refusing FGM is often forced submission.

Baltimore, Md., Apr. 28, 1995), reported in Still More on Asylum Claims,
252. In re J., No. A72-370-565 (IJ
supra note 86, at 1376.

253. Nancy Kelly et al., Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 813, 817 (June
27, 1994).
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In addition, before recognizing membership in a particular social group, courts
have required that the group exist for some reason other than the harm feared. If this
becomes the universal standard for asylum, the question that will need to be
answered is whether our courts will recognize that women in patriarchal societies do
exist as an identifiable group, completely separate from the fear of FGM?
Finally, the requirement of government action or acquiescence can be problematic
for women fleeing FGM. Although acquiescence in persecution by private
individuals or other groups should suffice, the U's holding in In re J. demonstrates
that when a practice has cultural underpinnings, Us are reluctant to require
government intervention. This notion of non-intervention by governments into
cultural matters brings us full-circle to questions of when and how it is appropriate
to critique, or even criticize, cultural practices.
The complicated and technical details of an asylum claim tend to make us forget
the more fundamental questions about why we grant asylum, and why we should
grant asylum in cases based on FGM. We grant asylum to individuals who are fleeing
persecution because we recognize that we have an obligation as a State and as
individuals to protect others from harm when their State is incapable of so doing.
Although it is appropriate that there be specific, stringent standards in order to
qualify for asylum, we should not create standards that fail to respond to real-world
conditions. Moreover, we should not abdicate our responsibility toward each other
as human beings out of fear of being named cultural imperialists. Instead, that "fear,"
or concern, should inform our choices and actions. The granting of asylum is an
appropriate way to address difficult cultural practices because it does not involve
exporting our ideas of fairness, human rights, or gender equality. Nor does it involve
forcibly imposing those ideas on other States and cultures. On the other hand,
granting asylum does protect deserving individuals, and does contribute to an
ongoing international dialogue regarding the treatment of women and girls. In
addition, granting asylum may contribute to the development of an international
customary norm prohibiting FGM. Granting asylum in appropriate cases is one way
to employ our concern and our humanity respectfully and to create new norms for
behavior. It is only in so doing that we, as a global community, will ever have a
chance at eliminating physically and psychologically damaging practices, such as
female genital mutilation.
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